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PECOVER V. ELECTRONIC ARTS, INC.: SHOULD EXCLUSVE
LICENSING AGREEMENTS MADE BY MADDEN NFL’S
PUBLISHER BE SACKED BY THE SHERMAN AND
CARTWRIGHT ACTS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Professional sports, in general, and the National Football
League (NFL), in particular, are big business in America.1  The li-
censing of team logos and player names for all manner of products
constitutes a large part of this business.2  The recent Supreme
Court case American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, in which a clothing manu-
facturer sued the NFL for granting an exclusive license to Reebok
to sell NFL branded apparel, drew large attention from academics
both before and after the Court’s decision.3 Pecover v. Electronic Arts,
Inc., in which a California federal court rejected a video game pub-
lisher’s motion to dismiss a claim based on the company’s exclusive
license with the NFL, addresses many of the same issues found in
American Needle but is instead a class action seeking injunctive relief
against the licensee, Electronic Arts, Inc. (EA), rather than the li-
censor.4 Judge Vaughn Walker certified the plaintiffs’ class, and as
EA’s licensing contract with the NFL is reportedly worth nine
figures, the software company is mounting a vigorous legal de-
fense.5  Given the hundreds of millions of dollars in sales the sports
1. For a discussion of the NFL’s revenue growth, see infra notes 14-19 and R
accompanying text.
2. For a discussion of the NFL’s licensing policies, see infra notes 19-22 and R
accompanying text.
3. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010). See,
e.g., Meir Feder, Is There Life After Death for Sports League Immunity? American Needle
and Beyond, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 407 (2011) (disputing arguments that
“zone of immunity” for sports leagues survived Supreme Court’s American Needle
decision); Gregory J. Werden, American Needle and the Application of the Sherman
Act to Professional Sports Leagues, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 395 (2011); Constan-
tine J. Avgiris, Huddle Up: Surveying the Playing Field on the Single Entity Status of the
National Football League in Anticipation of American Needle v. NFL, 17 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 529 (2010) (arguing NFL should be reviewed from “per se” approach
under section 1 of Sherman Act).
4. See Pecover v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 2009).  For a
discussion of the Court’s American Needle opinion, see infra notes 96-100.  For a R
discussion of the Pecover court’s treatment of the Seventh Circuit version of Ameri-
can Needle, see infra notes 132-134.  For an analysis of the Pecover court’s examina- R
tion of that case, see infra notes 173-175. R
5. See Brett Molina, Class Action Suit Over EA Football Games Charges Forward,
USA TODAY (Apr. 7, 2011, 9:18 AM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/
(167)
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video game market generates each year and the prevalence of ex-
clusive licenses between professional sports leagues and video game
developers, this case has potentially broad implications going
forward.6
Section II of this note establishes the relevant facts to Pecover,
beginning with a summary of the NFL’s revenue model in sub-part
(A), tracing the history of EA’s Madden NFL (Madden) franchise and
its exclusive license with the NFL in sub-part (B), and finally giving
a brief synopsis of the plaintiffs’ case and claims in sub-part (C).7
Section III delivers a picture of the law relevant to this case, starting
in sub-part (A) with a look at the development of jurisprudence
relating to section 2 of the Sherman Act.8  Sub-part (B) examines
related but more specific theories raised by the plaintiffs and by EA,
while sub-part (C) covers the pleading standards the plaintiffs must
meet.9  Section IV summarizes the court’s reasoning in its findings
for the plaintiffs.10  Section V first discusses the assumptions the
court made in determining if the plaintiffs’ claims were plausible
and the effect the procedural posture of the case had on the court’s
analysis.11  It then delves into the tension that can exist between a
licensor’s intellectual property rights and section 2 of the Sherman
Act, the suitability of the “essential facilities” doctrine as a theory of
liability, and whether the plaintiffs’ claims under California state
law are compatible with those made under federal law.12  Lastly, sec-
tion VI attempts to forecast the impact the ruling in Pecover may
gamehunters/post/2011/04/class-action-suit-over-ea-football-games-charges-for-
ward/1 (detailing email announcing certification sent to potential class members
and summarizing basic issues of case).  For a summary of EA’s deal with the NFL,
see infra notes 40-43. R
6. See, e.g., Jane L. Levere, Wary of Infringing Rival Games, Take-Two Calls Up
Football’s Golden Oldies, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007, at C5, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/07/23/business/media/23adco.html?ref=electronicartsinc
(“According to UBS, for the years 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2004, when NFL 2K was
published, Madden NFL generated sales of $686.3 million and NFL 2K had sales of
$142.7 million.  Today, Madden NFL is the best-selling video game in any category.
According to Wedbush Morgan Securities, it had sales of $278 million in 2005 and
$339 million in 2006, ranking No. 1 both years.”).  For a discussion of the current
state of the sports video game market, in terms of exclusive licenses, see infra notes
198-202 and accompanying text. R
7. For a discussion of Pecover’s factual background, see infra notes 14-49. R
8. For a discussion of Pecover’s legal background as it relates to the Sherman
Act, see infra notes 50-91. R
9. For a discussion of Pecover’s legal background as it relates to additional the-
ories of liability and pleading standards, see infra notes 93-122. R
10. For a summary of Pecover’s legal reasoning, see infra notes 123-154. R
11. For a critical analysis of Pecover’s legal reasoning, see infra notes 155-168. R
12. For a continued critical analysis of Pecover’s legal reasoning, see infra notes
169-194. R
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have on the case’s future iterations and the video game industry in
general.13
II. FACTS: “ONE OF THE GREATEST, MOST INSIDIOUS GUERRILLA-
WARFARE MOVES IN THE HISTORY OF VIDEO
GAME COMPETITION”
A. The National Football League: “The NFL is a
Perfect Portfolio”
Professional football is the most popular of America’s major
sports and as a business has been handily outperforming its rivals
for years.14  In 2009, the NFL generated approximately $8.5 billion
in revenue, and Commissioner Roger Goodell has set a revenue
goal of $25 billion by 2027.15  Even as the NFL attempts to meet this
lofty future goal, it is currently the most profitable sports league in
America.16
Among professional American sports leagues, the NFL is
unique in the extent to which it centrally generates and distributes
revenue to its thirty-two teams.17  Centralized cooperation allows
13. For a discussion of the impact of the decision in Pecover, see infra notes
195-211. R
14. See In a League of Its Own, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 27, 2006), http://
www.economist.com/node/6859210 (“The success of the NFL syndicate stands in
stark contrast to the troubles of America’s three other main sports leagues: for
baseball, basketball and ice hockey.  Whereas the NFL’s players have not walked
out since 1987 . . . the other three leagues have all faced crippling labour strikes
since the mid-1990s . . . .  [The NFL] has the highest total revenues of the four, at
nearly $6 billion a year.  It has the firmest grip on its labour costs, which have
grown only 9% a year since 1990, compared with 12-16% growth in the other three
leagues.  It remains the most popular of the four big American sports on almost
every measure, from opinion polls to television ratings.”).  The NFL has translated
these advantages into rising profits. See id.  (“The average football team has a mar-
ket value of around 3.9 to 4.4 times revenues, compared with ratios of 2.2 to 3.0 for
the other leagues.”).
15. See Daniel Kaplan, Goodell Sets Revenue Goal of $25B by 2027 for NFL, SPORTS
BUS. J. DAILY (Apr. 5, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/
2010/04/20100405/This-Weeks-News/Goodell-Sets-Revenue-Goal-Of-$25B-By-
2027-For-NFL.aspx (stating meeting $25 billion revenue goal by 2027 means ad-
ding nearly $1 billion in new revenue each year on average until then).  “Tripling
revenue in a roughly 17-year time frame is something the NFL has already accom-
plished, though off a much smaller base. . . .  The [salary] cap in 1994 was $34.6
million.  After several blockbuster national TV contracts and a surge in NFL popu-
larity, league revenue last year hit $8.5 billion, lifting the cap to $128 million, a
more than threefold increase from 1994.” Id.
16. See Jake I. Fisher, The NFL’s Current Business Model and the Potential 2011
Lockout, HARVARD COLL. SPORTS ANALYSIS COLLECTIVE 3 (May 4, 2010), http://
harvardsportsanalysis.files.wordpress.com/2009/09/the-nfl-business-model-and-
potential-lockout.pdf (examining sources of NFL’s profitability).
17. See id. at 3-4 (“The 60-40 split in nationally generated revenue to locally
generated revenue . . . is consistent with what NFL executives have cited . . . as the
3
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the NFL to maintain a more consistently competitive balance and
add 50-60% more value to its teams due to lowered risk levels.18
The NFL’s continued success and long popularity allow it to
charge high licensing fees for its content.19  Though the league is
an unincorporated association made up of separately owned teams,
it recently faced legal challenges for maintaining that it acts as a
“single economic entity” for the purposes of antitrust law when it
grants third parties the right to use NFL content.20  An apparel
league-wide distribution.”).  “The business model of generating and sharing such a
large quantity of central revenue is unique to the NFL.  Unlike the NFL, the NBA,
MLB, and NHL are more oriented on gate receipts and local media.  The NFL
generated $1.68 billion in local gate receipts in 2008, which is 22 percent of its
total revenue.  The NBA share of gate receipts to total revenue is 32 percent (2008-
09), the MLB share is 37 percent (2008), and the NHL share is 42 percent (2008-
09).  Other sports leagues and teams differ in their business models, as well.  NAS-
CAR, for instance, is built around sponsorship revenue.  In 2008, NASCAR col-
lected $1.5 billion of its estimated $3 billion in revenue from corporate
sponsorships.” Id. at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).
18. See In a League of Its Own, supra note 14 (“By getting the co-operative bits
right, the NFL as a whole benefits in two ways.  First, its teams are far more evenly
matched competitively than those in other leagues.  Several teams rise and fall in
the league tables from one year to the next, and every season provides many fresh
examples of how any team can win on ‘any given Sunday’.  That keeps supporters
coming back, and ensures that the bulk of the games remain interesting, even in
the final weeks of the season.  Second, the system lowers risk. ‘The NFL is a perfect
portfolio,’ says John Vrooman, a sports economist at Vanderbilt University, be-
cause one team’s losing season and sagging revenues are offset by another team’s
banner year.  The co-operative arrangements also make costs stable and predict-
able.  Mr Vrooman reckons that even if another American sports league, or a big
European football league, were to have similar cashflows to the NFL, the American
league’s teams would still be 50-60% more valuable because their business is so
much less risky.”).  Art Modell, former owner of the Cleveland Browns and Balti-
more Ravens, once referred to NFL team owners as “thirty-two fat-cat Republicans
who vote socialist” on football, but the twin policies of revenue sharing and enforc-
ing a strict salary cap have done wonders for profits. See id. (describing important
internal incentives that have allowed all teams to remain both financially viable
and athletically competitive).
19. See generally Fisher, supra note 16, at 4-5 (“[T]he NFL’s national media R
revenue is the backbone of the business. . . .  NBC, FOX, CBS, ESPN, DirecTV,
Sirius, EA Sports, and Verizon all pay significant rights fees for NFL content.  The
deals with FOX and CBS, which run through 2011, are reported to be worth $8
billion combined.  It is estimated that ESPN’s deal is worth $8.8 billion and NBC’s
is valued at $3.6 billion.  The DirecTV deal, extended for four years in 2009, is
valued at $4 billion.  Altogether, the NFL brought in around $3.74 billion in televi-
sion revenue in 2007.  This figure alone is larger than the $2.8 billion the NHL
made total in 2009 and is comparable to the $3.8 billion the NBA made in 2009
total revenue.  The rights fees for NFL content are substantial because of the suc-
cess of NFL broadcasts.  A regular season NFL game in 2009 drew an average of
16.6 million viewers, while other primetime shows on NBC, CBS, ABC, and FOX
averaged just 8.8 million viewers.  Moreover, the 12 highest rated broadcasts of the
past decade have been NFL games.”) (footnotes omitted).
20. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2206-07
(2010) (describing facts of case and general holding on question of Sherman Act
violation).
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manufacturer filed suit against the NFL after National Football
League Properties (NFLP), an entity set up to market the league’s
intellectual property, granted exclusive licenses to certain
manufacturers.21
B. Electronic Arts, Inc. and Madden NFL: “We Wanted to
Crush Them”
Media licensing is a pillar of the NFL’s business, and this in-
come stream is not limited solely to television and radio rights.22
Since EA acquired the rights to use real NFL teams and players, the
company’s Madden franchise has grown along with the now $20 bil-
lion-a-year video game industry.23  Almost 100 million copies of the
game have been sold, with two million copies occasionally moving
in a single week, generating more than $3 billion in total revenue.24
The NFL takes Madden very seriously, with some who work for the
league referring to it as the “thirty-third franchise.”25
Madden was born out of a meeting between Trip Hawkins –
founder of EA and Apple employee number sixty-eight – and the
game’s namesake.26  Due to John Madden’s insistence that the
game he helped develop be “real football” with eleven players on
21. See id. at 2207 (noting purpose of NFLP and arrangements that lead to
American Needle filing suit).
22. For a further discussion of the NFL’s extensive and lucrative media con-
tracts, including those with Electronic Arts, Inc. and Verizon, see supra note 19 and R
accompanying text.
23. See Patrick Hruby, The Franchise: The Inside Story of How “Madden NFL” Be-
came a Video Game Dynasty, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/eticket/story?
page=100805/madden (last visited Feb. 1, 2012) (“You can chart the game’s as-
cent, shoulder to shoulder, alongside the $20 billion-a-year video game
industry . . . .”).
24. See id. (listing sales figures for Madden).
25. Tom Bissell, Kickoff: Madden NFL and the Future of Video Game Sports,
GRANTLAND (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.grantland.com/story/_/id/7473139/tom-
bissell-making-madden-nfl (“The game has become a way for the league to hold
back encroaching hordes of young, shaggy, soccer-loving misfits and hook yet an-
other generation on pigskin. . . .  Several people told me that the Madden franchise
is regarded by the NFL as the league’s ‘33rd franchise.’  This derives from the fact
that, at the end of every week, EA Tiburon, along with every NFL team’s coaching
staff, is sent a massive searchable database of film in which every play of every game
is broken down by its situational peculiarities . . . .  This NFL ‘black box’ is how
opposing teams scout one another, and it’s how Madden game-design dev[eloper]s
identify and develop team and player tendencies.”).
26. See Hruby, supra note 23 (“On a cloudy morning in 1984, three men met R
in an Amtrak dining car winding through the Rocky Mountains, en route from
Denver to Oakland, Calif.  The first was Trip Hawkins . . . founder of video game
maker Electronic Arts . . . .  The second was Joe Ybarra, Hawkins’ lieutenant, a
high school chess champ turned pigskin fanatic.  The third was John Madden, the
former Super Bowl-winning coach, hardware store pitchman, televised NFL evan-
gelist and poet laureate of interior line play.”).  One year after Hawkins founded
5
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each side, it took over three years to program a game that could
run smoothly on the technology then available.27  While the game
enjoyed some modest success when it was originally released (with-
out an NFL license) on the Apple II computer, it wasn’t until EA
developed Madden for Sega Corporation’s new Genesis game con-
sole that it became an “industry game-changer, spawning yearly se-
quels and creating a lucrative revenue model that still persists.”28
Believing that Sega’s hardware represented the future for sports
games, Hawkins assembled a team in early 1990 to reverse engineer
the console in order to avoid paying Sega the licensing fees it nor-
mally demanded from game developers.29  Sega, fearing that EA
would sell the knowledge it gained by reverse engineering the con-
sole to other software companies, agreed to charge EA a fraction of
its normal per-unit licensing fee.30  Interestingly, before that year
had ended, Sega enlisted EA’s help when it realized that it would
not be able to complete a planned Joe Montana Football title in time
for the lucrative holiday season.31  EA had been tasked with devel-
EA, the company released the first video game to feature licensed sports celebri-
ties. See id. (tracing rise of Electronic Arts from start-up to software giant).
27. See Bissell, supra note 25 (“In 1984, the computing power that would make R
a tactically interesting, 11-on-11 football game was barely feasible, which is why
Hawkins was lobbying for a simpler game.  ‘I wouldn’t do it,’ Coach said, ‘unless
we had 11 guys on defense and 11 guys on offense.’”); Hruby, supra note 23 (“We R
were trying to model NFL football . . . on a computer with less horsepower than
your watch.”).
28. See Hruby, supra note 23 (describing transition from initial version of R
game to new way of thinking and resulting success on new platform).  EA picked
up an NFL license to use real teams for Madden NFL ‘94 and secured a Players
Association license to use actual player names for Madden NFL ‘95. See Travis Fahs,
IGN Presents the History of Madden, IGN (Aug. 8, 2008), http://retro.ign.com/arti-
cles/896/896893p1.html (detailing competition between EA and other developers
to publish NFL titles in early 1990s).
29. See Hruby, supra note 23 (“Secretly, Hawkins assembled a team to reverse R
engineer the console – that is, figure out a way to make EA’s games run on Sega’s
hardware without its technology or approval as a way to avoid licensing fees alto-
gether.  Publicly, he began negotiations with Sega, once meeting with the com-
pany’s executives while the reverse-engineering project went on in a nearby
room.”).
30. See id. (“Meanwhile, Hawkins revealed his reverse-engineering project to
Sega and offered a deal.  Let’s team up against Nintendo.  Share the glory.  You
can sue, but we did the tech fair and square and have great lawyers.  So make us an
official licensee.  And give us a reduced rate.  Sega normally charged an $8 to $10
fee per game cartridge.  Hawkins asked for $2 per game and a $2 million cap.
Negotiations stalled. . . .  Sega relented, afraid EA would sell its reverse-engineer-
ing knowledge to other software companies and torpedo the Genesis’ entire busi-
ness model.”).  Within three years, the deal had saved EA $35 million. See id.
(explaining license-related intrigue during early years of home game console
market).
31. See id. (describing proposition from Sega’s president that EA “give” Mad-
den to them).
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oping a competitor to its own game and, unsurprisingly, the title it
created for Sega was “totally inferior.”32  Nevertheless, both games
became hits and helped trigger a gaming boom that pushed EA’s
market cap from about $60 million in 1990 to $2 billion three years
later.33
Between the early 1990s and 2005, the Madden franchise faced
competition from several game-developers seeking to capitalize on
new technology and the demand for NFL football games.34  Sony
Corporation (Sony) offered NFL GameDay exclusively with its re-
cently released PlayStation console, and the title became the most
popular sports game on the market when EA’s development efforts
failed to produce a game for Sony’s console in time for the 1996
season.35  EA, facing a threat to its market dominance for the first
time, partnered with Tiburon Entertainment (which EA acquired
in 1998) as a fierce rivalry developed between it and Sony.36  Simi-
larly, Sega launched its NFL 2K series to near universal acclaim in
1999 after EA decided not to publish Madden for Sega’s new Dream-
cast console.37  Competition between the two titles led Sega to part-
ner with ESPN for the 2003 version of its game and to price 2004’s
32. See id. (quoting EA’s then-President and detailing steps EA took to ensure
game for Sega did not contain cutting-edge features).  “It’s not difficult to see how
the arrangement with SEGA could create a conflict of interest, and the result was
about what you’d expect.  John Madden Football’s 16-bit debut shipped in late
1990, in time for football season, while Joe Montana Football slipped several
months.  The SEGA offering featured a shallow playbook and less realistic
gameplay, as well as a lineup of only 16 teams.  Madden somehow managed to
pack 28 teams, better gameplay, and a pseudo-3D perspective that would become
its hallmark.” See Fahs, supra note 28. R
33. See Hruby, supra note 23 (noting EA’s growth following Madden debut). R
“[B]oth series managed to crack the top five best-seller list for the system, and
helped to raise the bar for video game football, leaving the rest of the industry
scrambling to catch up.  BlueSky Software took the reins of the Joe Montana
franchise, which would remain a rival for seasons to come.  Meanwhile, EA got to
work bringing their newly revamped Madden to as many systems as possible.” See
Fahs, supra note 28. R
34. See Bissell, supra note 25 (“The Madden franchise has seen a lot of compe- R
tition over the years: Joe Montana Football . . . which was released in 1991; the NFL
2K series, which ran from 1999 to 2005; NFL Gameday, which ran from 1994 to
2005.”).
35. See Fahs, supra note 28 (discussing problems EA had adjusting to new gen- R
eration of consoles).  “Every game has its champions, and not a few video game
football fans regard Gameday as having consistently made a better product than
Madden . . . .  ‘We were always nervous about Gameday.  We wanted to crush
them’ . . . .” See Bissell, supra note 25. R
36. See Fahs, supra note 28 (“In 1998, Sony’s Kelly Flock (the former captain
of 989 Studios) chided EA when he told Next Generation, ‘If you want to play next
year’s Madden early, buy this year’s GameDay.’”).
37. See id. (“[I]t was clear that they [EA and Madden] had been upstaged.”).
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ESPN NFL 2K5 at $19.99, thirty dollars less than Madden at the
time.38
Initially, EA lowered the price of Madden to $29.95.39  In late
2004, however, EA secured an exclusive licensing deal with the
NFL, ending the ability of any other game publishers to feature cur-
rent teams and players in football games.40  Within the next six
months, EA signed similar agreements with both the Arena Football
League (AFL) and the NCAA.41  EA extended its deal with the NFL
in 2008, and again in 2011, cementing its place as sole publisher of
officially licensed NFL videogames until at least 2013.42  The 2008
agreement is believed to have been worth well into nine figures
over the original five-year term, making it one of the most lucrative
non-television licensing contracts that the NFL enjoys.43
C. Pecover v. Electronic Arts, Inc.
EA’s lock on NFL gaming finally faced a challenge in 2008
when plaintiffs filed a class action suit in the Northern District of
38. See Bissell, supra note 25 (“The NFL 2K series pulled off one of the great- R
est, most insidious guerrilla-warfare moves in the history of video game competi-
tion when, in 2004, it released ESPN NFL 2K5 at the ridiculously enticing price of
$19.99 and carved a serious gouge in Madden’s domination of the football space.
One of the Madden dev[eloper]s I spoke to still remembers 2K5’s day of sneak-
attack infamy: ‘It scared the hell out of us.’”).  The title sold nearly three million
copies. See Fahs, supra note 28. But see In Pictures: American’s All-Time Top Vide- R
ogames, FORBES (June 3, 2008), http://www.forbes.com/2008/06/03/top-video-
games-tech-personal-cx_bc_0603video_slide_11.html (showing that Madden NFL
2005 sold 6.1 million copies).
39. See First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 3, Pecover v.
Elec. Arts, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 08-2820), 2011 WL
2609621 (“Three months after the entry of NFL 2K5 into the market, in November
2004, Electronic Arts lowered the price of Madden NFL from $49.95 to $29.95).
40. See Levere, supra note 6 (“[T]he dynamics changed late in 2004, when R
Electronic Arts entered into an exclusive, five-year agreement with the National
Football League and Players Inc., the licensing and marketing subsidiary of the
N.F.L. Players Association, to develop, publish and distribute football video games.
The pact ended the ability of Take-Two to feature current N.F.L. players in its
games.”).
41. See First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 39, at R
3 (noting timing of EA deals with AFL and NCAA).
42. Daniel Kaplan, NFL Gives EA a Break, SPORTS BUS. J. DAILY (Feb. 14, 2011),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2011/02/20110214/
Leagues-and-Governing-Bodies/NFL-EA.aspx (“‘Madden NFL 11’ last year was EA
Sports’ second-biggest selling title on a global basis, with more than 5 million units
shipped, trailing only its soccer title, ‘FIFA 11.’”).
43. See id. (speculating on terms of 2008 exclusive license).  “Another year of
an exclusive NFL license is significant for EA.  The company’s first deal in 2005
gave the publisher sole rights to league and player marks and intellectual property,
eliminating vibrant competition from 2K Sports’ ‘NFL 2K’ series.  That ushered in
a wave of full- and semi-exclusive deals in sports video game licensing.” See id.
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California seeking to represent all Madden purchasers from January
1, 2005 until the present.44  As described by the lawsuit’s website,
which is addressed to potential class members, plaintiffs
claim that Defendant Electronic Arts entered into a series
of exclusive licenses with the National Football League
(NFL), National Football League Players’ Association
(NFLPA), National Collegiate Athletics Association
(NCAA), and Arena Football League (AFL), which plain-
tiffs claim foreclosed competition in an alleged football
video game market.  Plaintiffs allege that this series of ex-
clusive licenses caused customers who purchased certain
football video games to be overcharged.  Defendant Elec-
tronic Arts has denied any liability and all allegations of
misconduct.45
The plaintiffs alleged six causes of action: (1) violation of the Sher-
man Act; (2) violation of California’s Cartwright Act; (3) violation
of California’s Unfair Competition Act; (4) unjust enrichment; (5)
violation of various other state antitrust laws; and (6) violation of
other state consumer protection laws.46  EA moved under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the plaintiffs’ com-
plaint.47  The court granted EA’s motion to dismiss claims five and
six to the extent that those claims relied on the laws of states other
than California and the District of Columbia, as the named plain-
tiffs did not purchase Madden in any states other than those.48  The
Court denied EA’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under the
Sherman Act, Cartwright Act, and others sections of California and
44. See id. (noting plaintiffs purchased game in Washington, D.C. and Califor-
nia and describing eligible members of class); Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP &
The Paynter Law Firm, PLLC Announce Notice of Class Certification in Pecover v. Elec-
tronic Arts, Inc. Lawsuit, Pecover v Electronic Arts, Inc., HAGENS BERMAN LLP (Apr.
6, 2011) (“The certified class includes all persons who, during the period January
1, 2005 to the present, purchased the Madden NFL, NCAA Football, or Arena
Football League brand video games published by Electronic Arts with a release
date of January 1, 2005 to the present.  Purchasers of software for mobile devices,
persons purchasing directly from Electronic Arts, persons purchasing used copies
of the relevant football video games, and Electronic Arts’ employees, officers, di-
rectors, legal representatives, and wholly or partly owned subsidiaries or affiliated
companies are excluded from the class.”).
45. Id. (articulating basic claims of plaintiff class).
46. See Pecover v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 976, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(listing claims made by plaintiffs).
47. See id. (explaining defendant’s motion).
48. See id. at 984-85 (granting motion to dismiss based on lack of standing).
9
Sharkey: Pecover v. Electronic Arts, Inc.: Should Exclusive Licensing Agre
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-1\VLS106.txt unknown Seq: 10 19-FEB-13 10:15
176 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20: p. 167
District of Columbia law, finding that the plaintiffs had alleged suf-
ficient facts to state a claim that was plausible on its face.49
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND: “AGREEMENTS THAT UNREASONABLY
RESTRAIN TRADE”
A. Evolving Interpretations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act:
“The Concerted-Unilateral Distinction”
Alleged antitrust violations are subject to the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act (“Sherman Act”), which was passed during a time of rapid
industrialization and the emergence of heavy manufacturing in
America.50  The law’s originator, Senator John Sherman, declared
that its purpose is to “prevent and control combinations made with
a view to prevent competition, or for the restraint of trade, or to
increase profits of the producer at the cost of the consumer.”51
The Sherman Act is concerned with two broadly defined categories
of activity.52  Section 1 deals with concerted action, involving some
sort of an agreement between multiple parties: “Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade . . .” shall be illegal.53  Unilateral actions by a single
49. See id. at 985 (denying motion to dismiss because complaint was well-
pleaded); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007) (articulating
“plausibility standard” required for complaints to survive motion to dismiss).
50. See JAMES T. HALVERSON & BRIAN J. TELPNER, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP,
MAKING SENSE OF SHERMAN ACT SECTION 2 IN THE HIGH-TECH ECONOMY 1 (2000),
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/25.pdf (giving context to origin of
Sherman Act); 2 ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON LICENSING
§ 7.01 (2011) (“In an earlier age of plentiful resources, owner management, slow
long-distance transportation (and slower communications) and innocence, Con-
gress enacted ‘antitrust’ provisions intended to stimulate commerce by prohibiting
conduct deemed to have a pernicious effect.  That legislation, generally known as
the antitrust laws, primarily consists of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (1890) and the
Clayton Act (1914).  These Acts were Congress’ response to the industrial, com-
mercial, utility and transportation enterprises that were frequently dominated by
individuals or groups whose methods of operating did not always withstand public
scrutiny.”).
51. See Brandon L. Grusd, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports’ League-
Wide Licensing and Merchandising Arrangements, 1 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 1, 16 (1999)
(quoting Senator Sherman from Congressional Record).
52. See id. (“The antitrust laws are primarily concerned with two types of activi-
ties.  The first type involves interactions between two or more parties, while the
second type concerns the actions of a single party.”).
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  “The Sherman Act prohibits agreements that
unreasonably restrain trade, but does not reach all agreements.  For example, sec-
tion 1 does not apply to an agreement between two managers of General Motors,
but it does apply to an agreement between a manager of General Motors and a
manager of Volvo.” See Gabriel Feldman, The Puzzling Persistence of the Single-Entity
Argument for Sports Leagues: American Needle and the Supreme Court’s Opportunity to
Reject a Flawed Defense, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 835, 842 n.34 (2009) (clarifying reach of
Sherman Act) (citation omitted).
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entity are covered solely by section 2: “Every person who shall mo-
nopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States . . . shall be punished.”54
The text of the statute has not changed since it was enacted in
1890.55  This is in keeping with Senator Sherman’s belief that his
legislation essentially codified common law with the sole addition
of new remedial sanctions.56  The Supreme Court has treated the
Sherman Act as such.57  While this characteristic has allowed the
law to survive unaltered for almost a century and a quarter, it may
also be why the Supreme Court has recently expressed concern with
the arguably capricious nature of antitrust litigation:
[A]ntitrust plaintiffs may bring lawsuits throughout the
Nation in dozens of different courts with different nonex-
pert judges and different nonexpert juries.  In light of the
nuanced nature of the evidentiary evaluations necessary to
separate the permissible from the impermissible, it will
prove difficult for those many different courts to reach
consistent results.  And, given the fact-related nature of
many such evaluations, it will also prove difficult to assure
that the different courts evaluate different fact patterns
consistently.  The result is an unusually high risk that dif-
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).  “The concerted-unilateral distinction between
Section 1 and Section 2 is critical, because it can be significantly easier to prove a
violation of Section 1 than a violation of Section 2.” See Feldman, supra note 53 at R
842.
55. See Halverson & Telpner, supra note 50, at 1 (contrasting origins of Sher- R
man Act with today’s service, technology, and information dominated economy).
56. See Milgrim & Bensen, supra note 50, at n.3 (stating Senator Sherman’s R
interpretation of Sherman Act).  “[T]he Court concluded that overruling [estab-
lished] precedent can be done where the Court is in a Common-Law, rather than
statutory context, the Court observing that the Sherman Act is simply a codifica-
tion of the Common Law.  In such a context, where the Court achieves greater
experience in the subject matter than it had at the time of its earlier ruling and
where other, subsequent, opinions of the Court make the initial ruling and these
subsequent opinions incoherent, precedent, even venerable precedent, is not a
bar to the Court’s ruling correctly.” See id. at n.7.1.
57. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 887, 899
(2007) (“From the beginning, the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a com-
mon-law statute.”). “Section 2 does not define the elements of the offense of at-
tempted monopolization.  Nor is there much guidance to be had in the scant
legislative history of that provision, which was added late in the legislative process.”
See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 454 (1993) (tracing origins
and initial interpretations of section 2 of Sherman Act).
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ferent courts will evaluate similar fact patterns differ-
ently.58
During the decades immediately following World War II, the
courts aggressively enforced the provisions of section 2 against firms
whose dominance the courts saw as creating structural barriers to
competition.59  In United States v. Grinnell Corp., for example, the
Supreme Court examined a section 2 claim brought by the govern-
ment against Grinnell Corporation (“Grinnell”).60  At the time,
Grinnell manufactured plumbing supplies and fire sprinkler sys-
tems while also possessing 87% of the “central station service” mar-
ket through its controlling stakes in American District Telegraph
Co. (“ADT”), Holmes Electric Protective Co. (“Holmes”), and Auto-
matic Fire Alarm Co. of Delaware (“AFA”).61  Beginning in 1907,
Grinnell entered into a series of agreements with the other compa-
nies granting exclusive rights to each to operate alarm, sprinkler,
and security services in various regions of the country.62  The dis-
trict court found that the defendants violated section 2 of the Sher-
man Act by monopolizing the protective services market.63
58. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 281-82 (2007)
(citation omitted); see also John DeQ. Briggs & Daniel J. Matheson, The Supreme
Court’s 21st Century Section 2 Jurisprudence: Penelope or Thermopylae, 11 SEDONA CONF.
J. 137, 141 (2010) (“This remarkable distaste for antitrust is a very far cry from
antitrust as the Magna Carta of free enterprise.”).
59. See Briggs & Matheson, supra note 58, at 138 (“During this post-World War R
II period of aggressive enforcement, the Supreme Court and lower courts sug-
gested that the Sherman Act condemned the use of monopoly power ‘to gain a
competitive advantage;’ even where the firm’s power was primarily attributable to
‘superior skill, industry, and foresight,’ and the dominant firm neither sacrificed
profits to gain its advantage nor intended to use the advantage to maintain or
further increase its monopoly power.”) (citations omitted).
60. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 566 (1966) (“This case
presents an important question under s 2 of the Sherman Act, which makes it an
offense for any person to ‘monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States.’  This is a civil suit brought by the United States . . . .”)
(citation omitted).
61. See id. at 566-67 (“[Grinnell] also owns 76% of the stock of ADT, 89% of
the stock of AFA, and 100% of the stock of Holmes.  ADT provides both burglary
and fire protection services; Holmes provides burglary services alone; AFA supplies
only fire protection service.  Each offers a central station service under which haz-
ard-detecting devices installed on the protected premises automatically transmit an
electric signal to a central station.  The central station is manned 24 hours a
day . . . .  [T]he record shows that subscribers to accredited central station service
(i.e., that approved by the insurance underwriters) receive reductions in their in-
surance premiums that are substantially greater than the reduction received by the
users of other kinds of protection service.”).
62. See id. at 567-70 (detailing long series of agreements dividing up different
segments of central station security services market).
63. See id. at 570 (noting district court found per se section 1 violations and
section 2 violations).
12
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In affirming the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court de-
scribed the elements needed to show a breach of section 2 as: “(1)
the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2)
the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distin-
guished from growth or development as a consequence of a supe-
rior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”64  The Court
defined “monopoly power” as “the power to control prices or ex-
clude competition.”65  The Court elaborated on this by noting that
such power can be inferred from the possession of a predominant
share of the market, leaving only the corresponding task of deter-
mining what constitutes the “relevant market” in question.66
The Court next cited a previously articulated standard, stating
that “commodities reasonably interchangeable make up that ‘part’
of trade or commerce which [section 2] protects against monopoly
power.”67  A fact-intensive analysis of the given product market is
warranted, taking into account how the product or service is used,
consumer preferences, the geographic scope of the product or ser-
vice, and other characteristics that may indicate a degree of differ-
entiation sufficient to make products non-substitutable.68  Applying
the first prong in Grinnell, for example, the Court found that while
the defendant companies offered a variety of services, in commer-
64. Id. at 570-71 (delineating separate elements necessary to prove section 2
violation).
65. United States v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956);
see also Milgrim & Bensen, supra note 50 at n. 9 (“Technically, a ‘monopoly’ bars R
others from competing in an activity previously open to all (e.g., the 17th Century
salt, tea and tobacco Crown monopolies).”).
66. See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571 (“In the present case, 87% of the accredited
central station service business leaves no doubt that the congeries of these defend-
ants have monopoly power – power which, as our discussion of the record indi-
cates, they did not hesitate to wield – if that business is the relevant market.”); see
also Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177
(1965) (“Without a definition of that market there is no way to measure [the de-
fendant’s] ability to lesson or destroy competition.”).
67. See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571 (citing du Pont, 351 U.S. at 395).
68. See id. at 572-76 (“Central station companies recognize that to compete
effectively, they must offer all or nearly all types of service . . . [A]lternate services
and devices differ, we are told, in utility, efficiency, reliability, responsiveness, and
continuity, and the record sustains that position . . . What defendants overlook is
that the high degree of differentiation between central station protection and the
other forms means that for many customers, only central station protection will do.
Though some customers may be willing to accept higher insurance rates in favor of
cheaper forms of protection, others will not be willing or able to risk serious inter-
ruption to their businesses, even though covered by insurance, and will thus be
unwilling to consider anything but central station protection . . . [T]he relevant
market for determining whether the defendants have monopoly power is . . . the
broader national market that reflects the reality of the way in which they built and
conduct their business.”).
13
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cial reality the entire accredited central station service business was
a single market.69  The Court acknowledged that while substitutes
for “accredited central station service” existed, such as watchmen
services, audible on site alarms, and non-accredited service provid-
ers, consumer and insurance provider behaviors demonstrated that
these alternatives did not have the low level of differentiation re-
quired to be independently part of the monopolized market.70
The Grinnell Court addressed the second prong of section 2
more succinctly, relying on the factual findings of the district
court.71  As evidence of a “willful acquisition and maintenance” of
illegal monopoly power, the Court described restrictive agreements
to carve out certain market areas where the companies would be
free from competition, various unfair pricing practices, and Grin-
nell’s separate acquisitions of the three large central station service
providers.72  The Court stated: “[Grinnell’s] control of the three
other defendants eliminated any possibility of an outbreak of com-
petition that might have occurred . . . . By those acquisitions it per-
fected the monopoly power to exclude competitors and fix
prices.”73
This vigorous style of section 2 enforcement faded in the late
1970s and early 1980s, especially as adherents to “Chicago School”
jurisprudential theory gained power in the Department of Justice.74
The enforcement of section 2 shifted from a focus on structural
69. See id. at 571 (agreeing with district court’s treatment and definition of
“relevant market”).
70. See id. at 572-73 (“There are, to be sure, substitutes for the accredited
central station service.  But none of them appears to operate on the same level as
the central station service so as to meet the interchangeability test . . . .”).
71. See id. at 576 (“We have said enough about the great hold that the defend-
ants have on this market.  The percentage was so high as to justify the finding of
monopoly.  And, as the facts already indicate, this monopoly was achieved large
part by unlawful and exclusionary practices.”).
72. See id. (“The restrictive agreements that pre-empted for each company a
segment of the market where it was free of competition of the others were one
device.  Pricing practices that contained competitors were another.  The acquisi-
tions by Grinnell of ADT, AFA, and Holmes were still another.  Grinnell long faced
a problem of competing with ADT.  That was one reason it acquired AFA and
Holmes.  Prior to settlement of its dispute and controversy with ADT, Grinnell
prepared to go into the central station service business.  By acquiring ADT in 1953,
Grinnell eliminated that alternative.”).
73. Id. (noting ability of company to consolidate monopoly power through
acquisition of control of competing enterprises).
74. See Briggs & Matheson, supra note 58, at 139 (“[T]he greatest changes in R
doctrine began with the appointment of William Baxter as the head of DOJ.  He
introduced to the broader antitrust community, and the bench: the Chicago
School; efficiencies; empiricism; economics-based guidelines; amicus briefs to
lower courts in an effort to shape the law at the bottom of the judicial pyramid,
and more.”).
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dominance to delineating the boundaries of specific business prac-
tices.75  In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., a jury found
that a parent company and its subsidiary had conspired to violate
the Sherman Act, but that a third-party company was not part of the
conspiracy.76  The Supreme Court repudiated the justifications for
allowing an alleged intra-enterprise conspiracy to create liability
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.77  To do so, the Court gave
guidance on the distinction between concerted and unilateral ac-
tion, and when violations can be found under section 2:
The conduct of a single firm is governed by Section 2
alone and is unlawful only when it threatens actual mo-
nopolization.  It is not enough that a single firm appears
to “restrain trade” unreasonably, for even a vigorous com-
petitor may leave that impression. . . . This is the rule of
the marketplace and is precisely the sort of competition
that promotes the consumer interests that the Sherman
Act aims to foster.78
In short, the Court increasingly sought to emphasize that the Sher-
man Act was passed to protect “competition, not competitors.”79
75. See id. (“The 1980s began with a bang.  Four of the largest antitrust cases
in history were concluded – three of them just abandoned . . . The end of these
cases could be regarded as the end of the era of antitrust challenges to structural
dominance.  Henceforth, § 2 enforcement and doctrine would primarily focus on
delineating the boundaries of specific competitive (or anticompetitive) practices,
in particular below-cost pricing, bundled pricing, exclusive dealing, and the use of
intellectual property.  And the approach to these specific practices has been consis-
tent with the Supreme Court’s post-1980 distrust of antitrust law’s role in gov-
erning aggressive competition by single firms.”).
76. See Copperweld Corp v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 757-59 (1984)
(articulating holding of district court and Seventh Circuit’s affirmation).
77. See id. at 766-67 (“Petitioners, joined by the United States as amicus curiae,
urge us to repudiate the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.  The central criti-
cism is that the doctrine gives undue significance to the fact that a subsidiary is
separately incorporated and thereby treats as the concerted activity of two entities
what is really unilateral behavior flowing from decisions of a single enterprise.  We
limit our inquiry to the narrow issue squarely presented: whether a parent and its
wholly owned subsidiary are capable of conspiring in violation of § 1 of the Sher-
man Act.  We do not consider under what circumstances, if any, a parent may be
liable for conspiring with an affiliated corporation it does not completely own.”).
78. See id. at 767 (citations omitted).  The Court further noted that, “In part
because it is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust competition from conduct
with long-run anticompetitive effects, Congress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny
of single firms only when they pose a danger of monopolization.  Judging unilat-
eral conduct in this manner reduces the risk that the antitrust laws will dampen
the competitive zeal of a single aggressive entrepreneur.” See id. (describing pur-
pose of section 2 of Sherman Act).
79. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977)
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
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This general interpretive trend is evident in Spectrum Sports, Inc.
v. McQuillan, which provides some final guidance for evaluating a
Sherman Act section 2 claim (though it involved allegations of at-
tempted monopolization).80  In Spectrum Sports, the Supreme Court
faced an appeal based on the proper definition of a section 2 of-
fense and a split in the circuit courts.81  The Ninth Circuit had held
that if sufficient evidence existed from which a jury could conclude
that a company had engaged in unfair or predatory conduct, then
both a specific intent to monopolize and a dangerous probability of
success in doing so could be inferred without proof of a relevant
market or a defendant’s market power.82  Citing to an array of Su-
preme Court precedent dating back to a 1905 opinion by Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
holding.83  Consistent with the approach of the other circuit courts
and its own case law, the Court stated that:
[I]t is generally required that to demonstrate attempted
monopolization a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defen-
dant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct
with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a danger-
ous probability of achieving monopoly power.  In order to
determine whether there is a dangerous probability of mo-
nopolization, courts have found it necessary to consider
the relevant market and the defendant’s ability to lessen
or destroy competition in that market.84
80. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 448-49 (1993) (“The
District Court entered a judgment ruling that petitioners had violated § 2, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that petitioners had attempted to mo-
nopolize.  The issue we have before us is whether the District Court and the Court
of Appeals correctly defined the elements of that offense.”).
81. See id. at 453 (“Every other Court of Appeals has indicated that proving an
attempt to monopolize requires proof of a dangerous probability of monopoliza-
tion of a relevant market.”).
82. See id. at 452-53 (citing Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.
1964)).
83. See id. at 454-58 (tracing developing role of intent, relevant market, and
actual monopolization in section 2 jurisprudence since 1905).
84. See id. at 456 (citation omitted).  To further clarify what it saw as an error
in the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, the Court went on to say that:
The concern that § 2 might be applied so as to further anticompetitive
ends is plainly not met by inquiring only whether the defendant has en-
gaged in “unfair” or “predatory” tactics.  Such conduct may be sufficient
to prove the necessary intent to monopolize, which is something more
than an intent to compete vigorously, but demonstrating the dangerous
probability of monopolization in an attempt case also requires inquiry
into the relevant product and geographic market and the defendant’s
economic power in that market.
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By this point in the 1990s the Court had repudiated, without
overruling, past case law that suggested section 2 could be violated
by a monopolist who merely acted to seize business opportunities
from rivals.85  Between 1992 and 2010, the Supreme Court issued
eighteen antitrust decisions and ruled for the plaintiff in only
one.86  The Justice Department under the George W. Bush adminis-
tration brought only three section 2 cases.87  This is not to say, how-
ever, that these trends are fixed or preclude plaintiffs from
bringing future section 2 claims.88  A Bush administration-era re-
port on section 2 enforcement was withdrawn as one of the first
major competition policy acts of the Obama administration’s Anti-
trust Division.89  The old report has been described as being “ex-
See id. at 459 (explaining type of conduct needed to show intent to monopolize
and accompanying factors needed to dangerous probability of success).
85. See Briggs & Matheson, supra note 58, at 139 (discussing Court’s decision R
not to continue to endorse Alcoa line of cases).  “The purpose of the Act is not to
protect businesses from the working of the market; it is to protect the public from
the failure of the market.  The law directs itself not against conduct which is com-
petitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy com-
petition itself.  It does so not out of solicitude for private concerns but out of
concern for the public interest.  Thus, this Court and other courts have been care-
ful to avoid constructions of § 2 which might chill competition, rather than foster
it.  It is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust competition from conduct with
long-term anticompetitive effects . . . .” See Spectrum Sports, Inc., 506 U.S. at 458-59
(citations omitted).
86. See Briggs & Matheson, supra note 58, at 141 (citing Brooke Group Ltd. v. R
Brown &Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Spectrum Sports Inc. v.
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996);
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S.
128 (1998); California Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756 (1999); Verizon
Commc’ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); U.S. Postal Serv.
v. Flamingo Indus. (U.S.A.) Ltd., 540 U.S. 736 (2004); F. Hoffman-la Roche Ltd. V.
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004); Volvo Trucks North Am., Inc. v. Reeder
Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006); Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006);
Illinois ToolWorks Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Leegin Creative
Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Sim-
mons Hardwood Lumber, 549 U.S. 312 (2007); Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct.
1955 (2007); Credit Suisse Secs. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v.
linkLine Commc’ns., Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009)).  The Court found for the plain-
tiffs in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
See id. at 141 (listing antitrust case where Supreme Court found for plaintiff).
87. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Obama Administration and Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1611, 1612 (2010) (describing recent past enforcement by
Antitrust Division).  “Under the administration of George W. Bush, the Antitrust
Division . . . was not enthusiastic about using Section 2 of the Sherman Act to
pursue anticompetitive single-firm conduct.” See id. (contrasting administrations’
approaches to section 2 enforcement).
88. See Briggs & Matheson, supra note 58 (listing recent lower court cases, R
Department of Justice statements, and Federal Trade Commission enforcement
actions that exhibit resistance to Supreme Court’s broadly exculpatory mood).
89. See Hovenkamp, supra note 87, at 1612 (“As soon as President Obama was R
elected, withdrawal of the Section 2 Report was virtually a foregone conclusion.”);
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tremely tolerant of single-form conduct, making it extraordinarily
difficult to prove a violation in many areas . . . .”90  While the admin-
istration withdrew the report so that its official policy would mirror
the president’s campaign positions, the Supreme Court recently
found for a plaintiff on at least a threshold issue in an antitrust
case.91
B. Doctrines and Theories of Liability Raised by Electronic Arts
in its Motions to Dismiss: “Antitrust Laws Protect
Competition as a Whole”
EA fought back against the plaintiffs’ claim by making the fol-
lowing specific legal arguments in support of its motion to dismiss,
each of which the court considered before ultimately rejecting.92
1. The Indirect Purchaser Doctrine
Since 1977, courts have generally refused to allow “indirect
purchasers” to bring actions for damages under federal antitrust
laws.93  “Indirect purchasers” are defined as “those who brought an
illegally monopolized or cartelized product or service through the
agency of a dealer, distributor, or some other independent reseller
who was not a participant in the antitrust violation.”94  The Su-
see also Justice Department Withdraw Report On Antitrust Monopoly Law, U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE (May 11, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/
245710.htm (announcing withdrawal of report and shift in enforcement
philosophy).
90. See Hovenkamp, supra note 87, at 1613 (explaining why Obama adminis- R
tration chose to withdraw report).  “Bitter experience with an earlier version of the
Justice Department’s Merger Guidelines demonstrated that business firms are enti-
tled to rely on antitrust guidelines.  As a result, the Division could not state a posi-
tion declaring one standard and later bring an action seeking to establish a
standard that is harsher on defendants.” See id. (citation omitted). But see Ashby
Jones, Sherman Stirs: U.S. Revives Section 2 of the Antitrust Act, WALL ST. J., July 7,
2009, at A7, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124693452204503961.
html (“Toward the end of [President Bush’s] second term, the administration is-
sued a report which codified its views on Section 2.  It took the position that the
marketplace, not government regulators or courts, provides the ideal check on
anticompetitive business practices.”).
91. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).  For
a further discussion of American Needle, see infra notes 96-100 and accompanying R
text. See Hovenkamp, supra note 87, at 1613 n.7 (“‘As president, I will direct my R
administration to reinvigorate antitrust enforcement’”).
92. See Pecover v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 976, 979-85 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (analyzing EA’s arguments for dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim).
93. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1717, 1717 (1990) (explaining origins of indirect purchaser rule).
94. See id. (defining subject of indirect purchaser rule).  This rule flows from
an earlier Supreme Court decision, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp, 392 U.S. 481 (1968), which held that a monopolist could not use the defense
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preme Court has given two rationales for maintaining this rule: (1)
apportioning damages along a chain of purchasers is very challeng-
ing and (2) allowing indirect purchasers to recover in this manner
potentially could provide for much more than the treble damages
authorized under federal law.95
2. The Single Entity Theory and Professional Sports Licensing
In 2010, the Supreme Court addressed arguments in American
Needle, Inc. v. National Football League that the NFL acted as a single
entity for antitrust purposes when it licensed intellectual property,
thus making it immune from scrutiny under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.96  Sports leagues have long viewed this defense as an anti-
trust “holy grail”, allowing them to avoid costly section 1 litigation.97
Courts, in turn, have analogized section 1 analysis to the “antitrust
equivalent . . . of water torture.”98  The Supreme Court has stated
that the concerted activity covered by section 1 is judged more
harshly than unilateral activity under section 2 because of the for-
mer’s potential to “deprive[ ] the marketplace of independent cen-
ters of decision making that competition assumes and demands.”99
In the end, the Court found that NFL teams do “compete in the
market for intellectual property” and “possess [neither] the unitary
decisionmaking quality [nor] the single aggregation of economic
power characteristic of independent action.”100
that a plaintiff, able to pass higher prices on to consumers, had not been injured
by the monopolist’s overcharge. See id. (citing to origins of indirect purchaser
rule).
95. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730-31, 737-44 (1977) (pro-
viding reasons for adhering to indirect purchaser rule).
96. See Feldman, supra note 53, at 835 (2009) (arguing “that a single-entity R
classification for sports leagues divorces antitrust immunity from the fundamental
purpose of the antitrust laws and is theoretically unsupportable.”).
97. See id. at 837 (“The leagues claim that this protection is necessary because
Section 1 litigation can be abusive and burdensome and deters them from engag-
ing in procompetitive behavior.”).
98. See In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, 955 F.2d 457, 475-76 (6th Cir. 1992)
(quoting In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 603
(1988)).
99. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 762, 768-69 (1984)
(distinguishing between Sherman Act section 1 and section 2 standards and diffi-
culties of showing each).  “For these reasons, § 1 prohibits any concerted action ‘in
restraint of trade or commerce,’ even if the action does not ‘threate[n] monopoli-
zation.’” See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2209
(2010) (quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768).
100. See Am. Needle, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2212-13 (explaining when NFL should
not be considered single-entity for sake of antitrust analysis).  The Court ultimately
reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings,
with the NFL’s conduct to be evaluated under the flexible Rule of Reason. See id.
at 2216 (“When restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be avail-
19
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3. The Essential Facilities Doctrine
This theory “imposes liability when one firm, which controls an
essential facility, denies a second firm reasonable access to a prod-
uct or service that the second firm must obtain in order to compete
with the first.”101  Thus, a monopolist that unilaterally refuses to
deal faces potential liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act.102
The Seventh Circuit has articulated four factors needed to prove a
claim based on this theory: “(1) control of the essential facility by a
monopolist; (2) a competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to
duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facil-
ity to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility to
competitors.”103
Essential facilities claims exist as an exception to the general
principle that a business has no obligation to deal with its competi-
tors.104  Due to this, a plaintiff must show that control of the facility
carries with it the power to actually eliminate competition.105  Next,
the plaintiff must prove that the benefit derived from access to the
asset cannot be obtained from other sources.106  Additionally, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that sharing the facility would not be
impractical or inhibit the defendant’s ability to serve customers ade-
quately.107  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the plaintiff
must be a competitor of the defendant.108
able at all, per se rules of illegality are inapplicable, and instead the restraint must
be judged according to the flexible Rule of Reason.  And depending upon the
concerted activity in question, the Rule of Reason may not require a detailed analy-
sis; it can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an eye.”) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
101. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 542 (9th
Cir. 1991) (defining essential facilities doctrine).
102. See Gregory J. Werden, The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doc-
trine, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433 (1987) (outlining basic liability under this type of
monopolization claim).
103. See MCI Commc’ns v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th
Cir. 1983) (listing factors needed to pass essential facilities liability test).
104. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601
(1985) (“The high value that we have placed on the right to refuse to deal with
other firms does not mean that the right is unqualified.”).
105. See Alaska Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d at 544 (finding that essential nature of
facility must compliment maintenance of monopoly).
106. See Apartment Source of Penn., L.O., v. Phila. Newspapers, Civ. A. No.
98-5472, 1999 WL 191649, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 1999) (noting how alternative to
facility must not be feasible).
107. See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(describing standard for evaluating feasibility of access to competitors).
108. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(finding competitive relationship must exist between parties for essential facilities
claim to be permissible).
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4. The Cartwright Act and the Rule of Reason
The Cartwright Act, codified at California Business and Profes-
sions Code sections 16700 to 16770, is California’s primary antitrust
statute and was enacted in 1907 with the purpose of protecting and
fostering business competition.109  The language of this statute is
very similar to that of section 1 of the Sherman Act, though it
phrases its prohibitions in narrower terms by listing several specific
forms of illegal combinations of business entities.110  Notably,
“[t]he Cartwright Act . . . has no [section 2] equivalent.  Monopoli-
zation, attempts to monopolize, or combinations or conspiracies to
monopolize are not practices specifically prohibited by the Act.
Thus, read literally, concerted activity between two or more persons
is required for a Cartwright Act violation to exist.”111  As applied to
specific practices, the law presumes that manifestly anticompetitive
restraints of trade are illegal per se, but evaluates other potential
restraints under the rule of reason.112
A determination of illegality under the rule of reason requires
knowledge and analysis of the line of commerce, the market area,
and the affected share of the relevant market.113  Federal courts
have looked at similar factors, starting first with the market power
of the business and defining that as “the ability to raise prices above
those that would prevail in a competitive market.”114  Next, a plain-
tiff has the burden of showing that the net anticompetitive effects
outweigh the procompetitive benefits, which then shifts the burden
to the defendant to provide a justification that the fact-finder must
consider when determining the overall reasonableness of the trade
109. See Kevin E. Stern, The High Cost of Convenience: Antitrust Law Violations in
the Computerized Ticketing Services Industry, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 349, 359
(1994) (stating origins of Cartwright Act).  For a further discussion of the Cart-
wright Act’s terms and how it has been interpreted, see infra notes 141-145 and R
accompanying text.
110. See Stern, supra note 109, at 361 (“A comparison of the Cartwright Act R
(sections 1670 and 16726 in particular) with the Sherman Act reveals that the Cali-
fornia antitrust statute is very similar, but not identical, to section 1 of the Sherman
Act . . . [T]he effect of the two statutes has been substantially the same.”).
111. See id. at 361 n.80 (distinguishing coverage of Cartwright Act from sec-
tion 2 of Sherman Act).
112. See Chavez v. Whirlpool Corp., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 175, 179-80 (Ct. App.
2001) (noting that California and federal antitrust law generally distinguish be-
tween conduct that is per se unlawful and conduct that is evaluated under rule of
reason).
113. See Fisherman’s Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Super. Ct., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628,
649 (Ct. App. 2004) (listing factors to be taken into consideration during rule of
reason analysis).
114. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391
(1956) (defining concept of market power).
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restraint.115  Finally, an antitrust injury entailing actual consumer
harm in the form of higher prices or decreased quality or output
must be shown.116
C. Pleading Standards: “Plausible on its Face”
Finally, the relatively recent changes in what standards a “well
pleaded” complaint must meet are especially relevant to Pecover.117
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly left commentators wondering whether
notice pleading was dead after the Supreme Court held that the
complaint in an antitrust case had to state a claim that is plausible
on its face.118  The Court further explained its Twombly decision in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.119  There, it noted that “[a] claim has facial plausi-
bility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”120  If a complaint makes merely conclusory
statements, Iqbal holds that the petitioner may not be entitled to an
assumption of veracity.121  Finally, it made clear that the Twombly
115. See Marc Edelman, Upon Further Review: Will the NFL’s Trademark Licensing
Practices Survive Full Antitrust Scrutiny? The Remand of American Needle v. Nat’l Football
League, 16 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 210-11 (2011) (stating criteria and procedu-
ral process for finding net anticompetitive effects).
116. See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 317
(2d Cir. 2008) (“Under the rule of reason, the plaintiffs bear an initial burden to
demonstrate the defendants’ challenged behavior had an actual adverse effect. . . .
Because the antitrust laws protect competition as a whole, evidence that plaintiffs
have been harmed as individual competitors will not suffice.”) (citations omitted);
see also Edelman, supra note 115, at 210-11 (summarizing what is needed to find R
antitrust injury in rule of reason analysis).
117. For a further discussion of the procedural posture in Pecover, see infra
notes 123-125 and accompanying text. R
118. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (“Here . . . we do
not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.  Because the plaintiffs here have not
nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint
must be dismissed.”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. Rev.
431, 431 (2008) (opining that age of notice pleading has ended).
119. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 662-63 (2009) (summarizing applica-
tion of Twombly to Iqbal facts).
120. See id. at 1949 (articulating pleading standard) (citations omitted).  The
Court goes on to state that: “[a]lthough for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we
must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we are not bound
to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” See id. at 1949-
50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. See id. at 1951 (“It is the conclusory nature of respondent’s allegations,
rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the pre-
sumption of truth.”).
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decision is generally applicable, as it was based on the Court’s inter-
pretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.122
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS: PECOVER CLAIMS SUCCEED
PRELIMINARILY, “WHETHER PLAINTIFFS WILL BE ABLE TO BACK THIS
UP WITH EVIDENCE IS A MATTER LEFT FOR ANOTHER DAY”
Judge Vaughn Walker first addressed the procedural posture
of the case, as EA’s motion to dismiss guided how he evaluated the
plaintiffs’ claims.123  Importantly, he noted that “[a]llegations of
material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.”124  Moreover, “all inferences
reasonably drawn from these facts must be construed in favor of the
responding party.”125
A. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act Claim
The court quickly set aside EA’s attack based on the “indirect
purchaser doctrine,” noting that this line of cases only prevents in-
direct purchasers from seeking damages under section 2 of the
Sherman Act rather than, as here, seeking injunctive relief.126
122. See id. at 1953 (“Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of a com-
plaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was based on our interpretation and ap-
plication of Rule 8.  That Rule in turn governs the pleading standard in all civil
actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.”) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
123. See Pecover v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 976, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(“A motion to dismiss . . . for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted ‘tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.’  Because [FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (6)]
on the sufficiency of a claim – and not the claim’s substantive merits
–’[o]rdinarily[ ] a court may look only at the face of the complaint to decide a
motion to dismiss.’”) (citations omitted).
124. See id. (citing Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th
Cir. 1989)).
125. See id. (citing Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Sev-
enth-Day Adventist Congregational Church, 887 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1989)).
126. See id. at 979-80 (“EA’s first attack – that the Illinois Brick indirect pur-
chaser doctrine bars plaintiffs’ section 2 claim – fails because the Illinois Brick indi-
rect purchaser bar only bars antitrust claims for damages by indirect purchasers,
whereas plaintiffs’ section 2 claim seeks only injunctive relief.”).  The court ex-
plained that:
In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court reasoned that such suits would force
courts to allocate illegal overcharges between middlemen and the ulti-
mate consumers and thus add ‘whole new dimensions of complexity to
treble damages suits and seriously undermine their effectiveness.’  The
Court further reasoned that allowing damages suits by indirect purchas-
ers would open the door to duplicative recovery from both direct and
indirect purchasers. Apportionment challenges and duplicative recovery
simply do not come into play in suits seeking injunctive relief and thus
Illinois Brick does not apply.
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The court next addressed EA’s contention that the plaintiffs
had not adequately alleged that “interactive video football software”
is a recognizable product market for the purposes of the Sherman
Act.127  After considering the points made by the plaintiffs in their
complaint, the court made clear that it must accept as true that
“there are no substitutes for interactive football software without
the markers of actual teams and players.”128  The court drew a dis-
tinction between plaintiffs’ argument and one alleging that there
are in fact no substitutes for football video games before it turned
its attention to the question of whether “interactive football
software is sufficiently distinct or appealing to consumers to consti-
tute a recognizable product market.”129  The plaintiffs defined a
See id. at 980 (citations omitted). But see Chris Sagers, Why Copperweld Was Actu-
ally Kind of Dumb: Sound, Fury and the Once and Still Missing Antitrust Theory of the
Firm, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 377, 378 n.7 (2011) (“Additionally indirect-
purchase plaintiffs can never sue in federal antitrust . . . .”) (citation omitted).
127. See Pecover, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (disagreeing with EA’s argument that
interactive video football software is not recognizable product market).  Here, the
court relies on the market allegations contained in the plaintiffs’ complaint:
As Electronic Arts well knew, consumers demand that the teams and play-
ers in interactive football software be identified with actual teams and
players.  This is only achievable through a license with a sports league and
associated players associations.  There is essentially no demand and there-
fore no market for interactive football software that is not based on real
life teams and/or players.  Electronic Arts recognizes this fact in its an-
nual report to investors where it notes that if it were “unable to maintain”
licenses with “major sports leagues and players associations” its “revenue
and profitability will decline significantly.”
By signing the exclusive agreement with the NFL, Electronic Arts immedi-
ately killed off Take Two’s NFL 2K5 software, the only competing interac-
tive football product of comparable quality to its Madden NFL franchise.
Through its agreements with the NCAA and AFL, Electronic Arts pre-
vented Take Two and others from re-entering the market with non-NFL
branded interactive football software.  Once again without a competitor,
Electronic Arts raised its prices dramatically.  Specifically, Electronic Arts
raised the price of the Madden 2006 videogame (released in August of
2005) nearly seventy percent to $49.95.  Electronic Arts currently sells in-
teractive football software for up to $59.95.
See First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 39, at 4-5. R
128. See Pecover, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (“As the court understands these alle-
gations, interactive football software will not sell if it does not use the names, logos
and other markers of teams that actually compete in the NFL; there is, in effect, no
market for interactive football software in a virtual or fictitious setting.”).
129. See id. at 980-81 (“Plaintiffs do not, however, allege that there are no
substitutes for interactive football software.  One does not need to be a devotee of
video games to recognize that any such claim would be implausible and possibly
subject to dismissal under the instructions of the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic
Corp v. Twombly to allege antitrust claims with a measure of plausibility.”).  The
court acknowledges that Ashcroft v. Iqbal appears to have extended the applicability
of the plausibility requirement, but that here it must “presume that other forms of
interactive video game software would substitute for interactive video football
software.” See id. at 981.
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distinct product market through a test outlined by the Department
of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, which asks whether a po-
tential monopolist could profitably impose a “small but significant
and nontransitory increase” in price.130  The court found that the
plaintiffs’ claims that EA’s agreement effectively “killed off” the
only competitive software and allowed EA to significantly raise its
prices sufficed, at the pleadings stage, to allege a distinct product
market.131
The opinion then examined the main cases that EA relied on
in its motion to dismiss, starting with American Needle, Inc. v. NFL
(which had not yet been appealed to the Supreme Court).132
Though the court suggested that it did not totally agree with the
reasoning of the Seventh Circuit on the issue of the NFL’s “single-
entity” theory, it found American Needle to be inapposite in this case
for two main reasons: (1) the defendants there were licensors of
intellectual property rather than the licensees; and (2) the exclu-
sive licensing contract there involved only one “provider of football
entertainment,” while Pecover involved the NFL, AFL, and NCAA.133
130. See id. at 981 (“A positive response suggests very limited functional inter-
changeability for the product in question and, for antitrust purposes, a distinct
product market.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
4 (Apr. 8, 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.
pdf (articulating product market definition).
131. See Pecover, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (accepting allegations for purposes of
pleading claims at bar).
132. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008).
See Pecover, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (“EA devotes much of its attention to [American
Needle], which held that an exclusive licensing contract between the NFL and
Reebok, which manufactures football headwear, did not constitute an unreasona-
ble restraint of trade in violation of section 1 [of the Sherman Act].  The plaintiff
had contended that the individual teams in the NFL were separate entities, so that
the league’s agreement with Reebok was unlawful horizontal or coordinated con-
duct.”).  “Without definitively resolving the single-entity question for all purposes,
the court of appeals focused on whether the agreement before it ‘deprived the
market of independent sources of economic power’ and, affirming, concluded
that the agreement did not do so.  The court reached this conclusion because it
viewed the joint licensing of NFL intellectual property as intended to promote
NFL football as against other forms of entertainment.” See id. (quoting Am. Needle,
Inc., 538 F.3d at 743-44) (citations omitted).  The appellate court also found that
the failure of American Needle’s Sherman Act section 1 claim doomed its section 2
claim, as a “single entity” NFL is free “to license their intellectual property on an
exclusive basis even if the teams opt to reduce the number of companies to whom
they grant licenses.” See Am. Needle, Inc., 538 F.3d at 744 (citations omitted).
133. See Pecover, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 981-82 (explaining why American Needle
does not provide persuasive support for EA’s argument).  The court evaluated the
Seventh Circuit’s holding by stating that:
The single-entity rationale is, of course, persuasive in the context of
NFL’s role as a competitor in the entertainment business.  An individual
team can offer no entertainment value without the other teams in the
league.  Although this single-entity theory is somewhat less persuasive (to
25
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Following this analysis, the court turned its attention to a line
of cases cited by EA in support of what amounts to an “essential
facilities” claim.134  The court first discussed Paddock Publications,
Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co.135  In this Seventh Circuit case, Judge Eas-
terbrook dismissed a complaint based on the section 1 of the Sher-
man Act for being fundamentally about “essential facilities” but
lacking in “any essential facility.”136  Unlike in Paddock Publications,
however, the plaintiffs’ complaint in Pecover “alleges that the names
and logos of actual teams and players are essential to market inter-
active football software.”137  The court also rejected EA’s attempt to
draw parallels between Pecover and Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc., in which the Third Circuit rejected another “essential facili-
ties” claim for failing to show the requisite “bottleneck” restricting
competition.138  The court believed it was important that the Third
the undersigned, at least) when it comes to licensing NFL team logos on
headwear (after all, individual teams could make their own license agree-
ments), nonetheless the court of appeals viewed licensing headwear as
simply an extension of the NFL’s competition in promoting the en-
tertainment it provides.
See id. at 982.
134. See id. (citing appellate level cases discussing essential facilities doctrine).
For a discussion of the essential facilities doctrine, see supra notes 101-108 and R
accompanying text.
135. See Paddock Publications, Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42 (7th
Cir. 1996).
136. See Pecover, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 982 (“In Paddock, a suburban daily newspa-
per in the Chicago metropolitan area, the Daily Herald, asserted claims under sec-
tion 1 against the two major dailies in Chicago, the Tribune and the Sun-Times, that
they had “locked up” the most popular or best supplemental services or features
through exclusive agreements with the New York Times and Los Angeles Times/Wash-
ington Post news and features syndicates.  The Herald did not contend that the Trib-
une and Sun-Times had conspired nor that the news and features syndicates had
coordinated their conduct.”) (citation omitted).
137. See id. (citing First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 4,
Pecover v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 08-2820),
2011 WL 2609621).  The court does qualify this holding, stating that “whether
plaintiffs will be able to back this up with evidence is a matter left for another day.”
See id. (acknowledging impact of pleading standards applicable to this stage of
proceedings).
138. See Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F. 2d 139 (3d Cir.
1981). See Pecover, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 982-83 (“The court then opined that because
‘Fleer or any other trading card manufacturer [ ] may compete with Topps for
minor league players or even persuade the present major league players not to
renew their Topps’ contracts’ the accumulation of exclusive licenses in that case
failed to restrict competition sufficiently to violate section 1.”) (citations omitted).
The court found the Fleer case to be more factually analogous to Pecover than Pad-
dock Publications, summarizing the case as such:
The parties, Fleer Corporation and Topps Chewing Gum, produced bub-
ble gum and similar products.  Topps had acquired exclusive licenses to
the photographs and statistics of baseball players for use in producing
baseball trading cards and, at the time of the case, Topps was the only
26
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Circuit decided Fleer on a motion for summary judgment, as it also
received Pecover at an early procedural stage where the plaintiffs’
allegations had to be taken as true.139
Based on this series of analyses, the court denied EA’s motion
to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the Sherman Act sec-
tion 2.140
B. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Cartwright Act Claim
Next, the court rejected EA’s arguments that the plaintiffs’
Cartwright Act claim should be dismissed.141  EA contended that
(1) the signing of multiple exclusive licensing deals does not create
a restraint of trade; and (2) if those agreements are not the “con-
spiracy” alleged in the plaintiffs’ complaint, then enough factual
details have not been alleged to survive the motion to dismiss.142
The court explained its understanding of California’s Cartwright
Act, noting that it generally codifies common law prohibitions on
the restraint of trade and evaluates such restraints using a “rule of
reason” analysis.143  Before it addressed the case law EA cited in
seller of baseball trading cards sold in connection with bubble gum.  The
district court found the relevant product market to be “pocket-size pic-
tures of active major league baseball players, sold alone or in combina-
tion with a low cost premium, at a price of 15 to 50 cents.”  Although the
court of appeals assumed without deciding that this market definition was
correct, the court noted (and perhaps was influenced by the fact) that
baseball trading cards accompany “a variety of other non-confectionary
products.”  The court also pointed out that Fleer had left the baseball
trading card business nine years before the suit was filed by selling its
existing baseball player licenses to Topps.
See id. at 982 (citations omitted).
139. See id. at 983 (“The court noted that the determination whether the de-
fendant’s conduct excluded all meaningful competition was a mixed question of
law and fact.  Here, on EA’s motion to dismiss, the court must take as true plain-
tiff’s factual allegations . . . .  These allegations distinguish this case from Fleer.”)
(citation omitted).
140. See id. (concluding discussion of EA’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ Sher-
man Act section 2 claim).
141. See id. at 983-84 (reviewing Cartwright Act case law as applied to EA’s
arguments).
142. See id. at 983 (“EA next moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ Cartwright Act claim.
EA argues, consistent with its argument against the section 2 claim, that signing
multiple exclusive agreements cannot constitute a restraint of trade.  EA continues
that if the exclusive agreements are not the ‘conspiracy’ alleged in the complaint,
then the complaint lacks the requisite factual details of the alleged Cartwright Act
violation.”) (citation omitted).
143. See id. (summarizing interpretations and application of Cartwright Act).
Generally, “The Cartwright Act makes unlawful a ‘trust,’ defined as ‘a combination
of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons’ for the purposes of restraining
commerce and preventing market competition in the variety of ways listed in the
statute.” See id. (quoting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (2012)).
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support of its argument, the court stated that California courts have
found that vertical restraints of trade (such as exclusive dealing ar-
rangements) are not illegal per se but can violate the Act.144  The
court found that the exclusive agreements, as described in the
plaintiffs’ complaint, could plausibly be found to violate the Cart-
wright Act’s “rule of reason” test, thus ensuring the claim survived
EA’s motion to dismiss.145
The court then compared the facts alleged in Pecover to those
in Levi Case Co. v. ATS Products, which involved a patent holder
granting an exclusive license to a sublicensee.146  EA relied on Levi
Case for the “proposition that parties to an exclusive license who are
not competitors are legally incapable of conspiring in violation of
the antitrust laws.”147  The court distinguished Pecover from the facts
of Levi Case by first pointing out that the Pecover complaint “alleges
the aggregation of multiple exclusive agreements to choke off com-
petition in a way that is not legally sanctioned, unlike the exclusive
agreement involving a single patent.”148  Second, the court ac-
144. See id. (citing Fisherman’s Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Super. Ct., 7 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 628, 649 (Ct. App. 2004)) (“California courts have determined that verti-
cal restraints of trade, such as exclusive dealing arrangements, can violate the Cart-
wright Act, though they are not illegal per se.  ‘The law conclusively presumes
manifestly anticompetitive restraints of trade to be unreasonable and unlawful,
and evaluates other restraints under the rule of reason.’  Vertical restraints, includ-
ing exclusive dealing arrangements, are proscribed when it is probable that per-
formance of the arrangements will foreclose competition in a substantial share of
the affected line of commerce.  The rule of reason analysis requires a factual analy-
sis of the line of commerce, the market area and the affected share of the relevant
market.”).  The court states, however, that “[s]uch a factual inquiry is inappropri-
ate at this stage in the proceedings.” See id. (deferring fact-finding to separate
stage of legal process).
145. See id. (“Accordingly, the exclusive licenses themselves, described ade-
quately in the complaint, constitute the conduct giving rise to the Cartwright Act
claim.”).
146. See Levi Case Co., Inc. v. ATS Products, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 428 (N.D. Cal.
1992). See Pecover, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 984 (summarizing basic facts of case).
147. See Pecover, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 983-84 (discussing EA’s interpretation of
Levi Case).  While Levi Case involved the Sherman Act, EA could make this analogy
because the Cartwright Act and the federal law are interpreted in harmony with
one another. See id. at 984 (citing Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival Enters., Inc.,
908 F.2d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 1990)).  The court noted that Levi Case, in turn, appro-
priated the Supreme Court’s holding in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Co.,
which said that a corporation and its subsidiaries are incapable of conspiring for
purposes of section 1 of the Sherman Act. See id. at 984 (citing Copperweld Corp.
v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)).  “Copperweld reasoned that coordi-
nated activity by parties who lack independent sources of economic power and
separate interests does not warrant antitrust scrutiny.” Id. (citing Copperweld, 467
U.S. at 771).
148. See id. (describing facts and reasoning of Levi Case and distinguishing
opinion from Pecover).  In Levi Case, “the patent holder’s only rights relating to the
patent after the exclusive license were to receive royalties and approve sublicenses.
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cepted the argument that, as the NFL, AFL, and NCAA are in a
sense competitors with each other, a series of agreements between
“each of [those] entities and EA could plausibly deprive the market-
place of independent sources of economic power.”149  As with the
Sherman Act claim, the court denied EA’s motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ Cartwright Act cause of action.150
C. The Remaining State Law Claims
In the opinion’s final section, the court addressed EA’s motion
to dismiss various claims made under District of Columbia, Califor-
nia, and eighteen other states’ laws.151  The court refused to reject
the unfair competition and unjust enrichment claims made under
California law, as EA urged them to be dismissed based on its argu-
ment that the Cartwright Act claims should also not survive.152  The
court also denied EA’s motion to dismiss the claim made under the
consumer protection laws of Washington, D.C.153
Ultimately, the court did grant EA’s motions to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ claims for the violation of various other states’ antitrust,
restraint of trade, consumer protection, and unfair competition
laws.154
The patent holder, by virtue of the exclusive license, could not compete in the
market covered by the patent and neither could anyone else because a patent is a
legally-sanctioned restraint on trade.” See id. (citation omitted).
149. See id. (hypothesizing impact of EA’s exclusive licensing deals on
market).
150. See id. (finding facts alleged by plaintiffs to plausibly amount to Cart-
wright Act violation).
151. See id. (“EA moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for unfair competition and
unjust enrichment under California law, violation of the District of Columbia Con-
sumer Protection Procedures Act and violation of the antitrust and consumer pro-
tection laws of eighteen states in which plaintiffs did not purchase the Madden
NFL video game.”) (citation omitted).
152. See id. (“Because the court finds that the Cartwright Act survives EA’s
motion to dismiss, the court will not dismiss plaintiffs’ other California law claims
on that basis.”).
153. See id. (allowing claim made under District of Columbia Consumer Pro-
tection Procedures Act to survive).
154. See id. at 979, 984-85 (granting EA’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ fifth and
sixth claims for violation of laws of states other than where plaintiffs purchased
Madden).  Not only did the court find that the plaintiffs, having purchased Madden
only in California and the District of Columbia, did not have standing to bring
such claims, it noted that the plaintiffs conceded this point by not addressing the
issue in their response to EA’s motion to dismiss. See id. at 984 (“[P]laintiffs have
effectively conceded, by failing to address the issue in their opposition memoran-
dum, that their claims under the laws of states in which plaintiffs did not purchase
the Madden NFL video game should be dismissed.  The named plaintiffs in this
action purchased the video game at issue in California and the District of Colum-
bia and have alleged no basis for standing to bring claims under the laws of other
states.”) (citation omitted).
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V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: “THE LICENSORS HAVE THE WHIP’S HAND
WHEN IT COMES TO CONTROLLING OUTPUT”
As the court decided Pecover on a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, it is appropriate to first consider the opinion’s
treatment of the then-new Twombly/Iqbal standards for evaluating
pleadings.155  The court’s ultimate holding relies heavily on its obli-
gation to take allegations of material fact as true and to construe
these allegations in a light most favorable to the non-moving party,
in this case the plaintiffs.156  However, as the Pecover court notes, the
complaint alleging a section 1 violation in Twombly failed because
the Supreme Court found that sufficient plausible facts needed to
bring the conduct in question into the realm of illegality had not
been pleaded.157  Extending this reasoning to the case at hand, it
155. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Stan-
dards on to Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261, 262 (2009) (“Since the early
nineteenth century, the interpretation of the Seventh Amendment preservation of
the right to a civil trial by jury has remained static and become increasingly anach-
ronistic.  Over the same period of time, the evolution of modern civil procedure
pleading standards has been on a collision course with that interpretation.  The
penultimate 2007 Supreme Court opinion in this field, Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, raised the specter of an impending impasse between pleading standards
and the Seventh Amendment.  The 2009 opinion in Ashcroft v. Iqbal is the point
of impact.”); Douglas G. Smith, The Evolution of a New Pleading Standard: Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 88 OR. L. REV. 1053, 1053-55 (2009) (describing cases as watershed events
destined to bring on radical changes to ability of plaintiffs to plead claims, there-
fore potentially revolutionizing federal civil practice).
156. See Pecover v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 976, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(“If true – as the court must at this point accept – this adequately alleges that there
are no substitutes for interactive football software without the markers of actual
teams and players.”); id. at 981 (“[T]he court presumes that other forms of interac-
tive video game software would substitute for interactive video football software.”);
id. (“Plaintiffs allege that EA’s exclusive agreement with the NFL ‘killed off’ the
only other allegedly competitive interactive software and allowed EA to raise its
prices ‘dramatically.’  For purposes of pleading the claims at bar, these allegations
suffice to allege a product market.”); id. at 983 (“Here, on EA’s motion to dismiss,
the court must take as true plaintiff[s’] factual allegations . . . .”). See also Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (“Although for the purposes of a motion to
dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we are
not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation . . . .
[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dis-
miss”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (“In applying
these general standards to a § 1 claim, we hold that stating such a claim requires a
complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement
was made.  Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agree-
ment.  And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a
savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is
very remote and unlikely.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Twombly, for example, the court was unwilling to make this “leap” from the
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follows that the court has made the jump (or, “reasonable infer-
ence” under Iqbal) that the facts alleged by the plaintiffs are not just
true, but also in violation of the law.158  The Pecover court’s opinion
systematically rejected EA’s line of cases, and in so doing first ad-
dressed the legality of EA’s actions without engaging in a traditional
analysis under section 2 of the Sherman Act.159
The court focuses on two main allegations from the plaintiffs’
brief.160  First, the court assumes that “interactive video football
software” featuring the names, logos, and other intellectual prop-
erty of real life professional teams constitutes a distinct product
market for Sherman Act purposes, and that there is essentially no
market for football software lacking the required licenses.161  Sec-
ond, the court takes as true that once EA acquired its exclusive li-
cense, it was able to corner this distinct product market by
eliminating its competition and then raising prices from where they
had been prior to this grant.162  In doing so, the court indirectly
addresses the two prongs identified in Grinnell as necessary to a suc-
cessful section 2 claim: (1) the possession of monopoly power in a
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power due to something other than a superior product, busi-
ness prowess, or historical accident.163
Though Grinnell involved a company coordinating nationally
how services would be provided at a local level, compared to one
firm distributing a product across the country after acquiring sepa-
possible to the plausible because they had “the benefit of the prior rulings and
considered views of leading commentators . . . that lawful parallel conduct fails to
bespeak unlawful agreement.  It makes sense to say, therefore, that an allegation of
parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice.” See id. (ex-
plaining why facts as pleaded and nature of legal theory did not meet pleading
standard).
158. For a further discussion of the pleading standards articulated in Twombly
and Iqbal, see supra notes 117-122 and accompanying text. R
159. See Pecover, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 979 (“The theories advanced by EA for
dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act miss their mark.”).
For a history of tests courts have developed for analyzing potential violations of
section 2, see supra notes 59-91 and accompanying text. R
160. For a general summary of the plaintiffs’ primary allegations, see supra
notes 127-131 and accompanying text. R
161. See Pecover, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 980, 982 (deferring to factual allegations
contained in plaintiffs’ brief); see also First Amended Complaint and Demand for
Jury Trial, supra note 39, at 4 (discussing consumer demand for fully licensed foot- R
ball video games).
162. See Pecover, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 981, 983 (citing plaintiffs’ brief for argu-
ment that EA’s license and resulting lack of competition allowed it to raise price of
game from $49.95 to $59.95).
163. For a discussion of the facts of Grinnell and the Court’s reasoning there,
see supra notes 60-73 and accompanying text. R
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rate licenses, the parallels between its facts and those in Pecover sug-
gest that Judge Walker properly applied the main tenets of section
2 law.164  As of 2003, Madden took in approximately sixty-five to
eighty-five percent of what was then a $400 million market for
sports console games.165  In Grinnell, the court inferred monopoly
power from a market share just slightly more than that.166  Since
the NFL granted its exclusive license to EA, football games featur-
ing former or fictional players have failed to gain popularity with
consumers.167  Similarly, the court in Grinnell found that central se-
164. Compare United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966) (“The
restrictive agreements that pre-empted for each company a segment of the market
where it was free of competition of the others were one device.  Pricing practices
that contained competitors were another.  The acquisitions by Grinnell of ADT,
AFA, and Holmes were still another.  Grinnell long faced a problem of competing
with ADT . . . .  By acquiring ADT in 1953, Grinnell eliminated that alternative.  Its
control of the three other defendants eliminated any possibility of an outbreak of
competition that might have occurred . . . .”), with Pecover v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 633 F.
Supp. 2d at 984 (“Levi Case is distinguishable from the instant complaint, which
alleges the aggregation of multiple exclusive agreements to choke off competition
in a way that is not legally sanctioned, unlike the exclusive agreement involving a
single patent.  Moreover, the NFL, AFL and NCAA may each have exclusive agree-
ments with EA, but they are competitors with each other.  A series of agreements
between EA and each of these entities could plausibly deprive the marketplace of
independent sources of economic power.”).  While the opinion in Pecover does not
methodically scrutinize the prongs of a prior test, this is not entirely out of line
with the way antitrust analyses have developed. See David M. Rievman, The Grinnell
Test of Monopolization Sounds a False Alarm: Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 28 B.C. L. REV. 415, 415 (1987) (“Yet while sections 1 and 2 of the Act cata-
log in broad terms the various illegal practices at which the Act’s enforcement
provisions are directed, the text of the Act itself provides no clear criteria or tests
to define and identify the proscribed anticompetitive conduct.  Thus, it has largely
been left to the courts to formalize the elements required to make out a prima
facie case for a section 1 or section 2 Sherman Act violation.”).
165. See Chris Suellentrop, Madden Sports’ New Arbiter of Cool, SLATE (Aug. 14,
2003, 6:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/assessment/
2003/08/madden.html (“Last year . . . nearly 20 percent of console games sold
were non-racing sports games.  That’s $1 billion in sales, of which football games
reaped the biggest share, as much as 40 percent.  And Madden takes in anywhere
from 65 percent to 85 percent of the football game market, depending on whom
you ask.”).  “Last year, the NFL made more money from licensing Madden to EA
Sports than from any other licensed product, except for apparel.” Id.  In the two
years after the exclusive license was signed, Madden was the best-selling game in
any category. See Levere, supra note 6 (detailing Madden and NFL 2K sales prior to R
and after grant of license).
166. For a discussion of the Grinnell Court’s use of market share to define
monopoly power, see supra note 66 and accompanying text. R
167. See, e.g., Nat Ives, Coming for Gamers: Football Unfettered, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
20, 2004, at C8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/20/business/me-
dia/20nfl.html?ref=electronicartsinc (describing developers’ attempts to creatively
attract consumers to games without NFL license); Lefevre, supra note 6 (detailing R
Take Two’s efforts to market a niche football game featuring retired NFL players);
Seth Schiesel, With Famed Players, Game Takes on Madden’s Turf, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 17,
2007, at C3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/17/technology/
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curity stations constituted a distinct product market because con-
sumers considered the service to be the only acceptable option, not
an interchangeable commodity.168
Regarding EA’s alleged willful acquisition of monopoly power,
it is clear that the company did not stumble into its agreements with
the NFL, AFL, and NCAA.169  However, the defendants in Grinnell
spent over fifty years consolidating control over the industry
through agreements to divide up the market, severely discourage
competition, set prices, and acquire potential rivals before there
could be any “outbreak of competition.”170  EA may have exhibited
a certain level of intent to monopolize the market when it secured
the exclusive licenses in question, but its conduct is less explicitly
anticompetitive than that in Grinnell and may fall under the “supe-
rior product [or] business prowess” exceptions listed in that case.171
As EA’s attorneys argued, the company bid on offers by the
NFL, AFL and NCAA, and those leagues have the prerogative to
determine to whom and under what terms they will grant li-
censes.172  Though this argument is not without some merit, EA’s
concurrent reliance on the Seventh Circuit’s American Needle opin-
17game.html?ref=electronicartsinc (“Of course, in the video game business, as in
football, it is never easy to knock off a champion, in this case the Madden
franchise.  In a conference call last month, Take-Two’s chief executive, Ben Feder,
said, ‘We’re not terribly pleased and not disappointed’ by sales of All-Pro Football,
which was released in July.”).
168. For a further discussion of the “interchangeability” component of Grin-
nell’s distinct market prong, see supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. R
169. For a discussion of the competitors EA faced prior to the license agree-
ments, EA’s feelings about the competition, and the licensing deals struck, see
supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text. R
170. For a further discussion of the defendant’s illegal practices in Grinnell,
see supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. R
171. See Rievman, supra note 164, at 416 (“It is clear from both the legislative R
history surrounding passage of the Sherman Act and from the judicial decisions
interpreting the Act that section 2 does not prohibit monopoly per se.  The Senate
debates on the Sherman Act reflect the intention of the drafters that the Act only
prohibit monopolies acquired through abuse of the competitive process, not those
legitimately obtained through lawful competitive conduct.”).
172. See Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss at 19, Pecover v. Elec.
Arts, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 08-2820) (“By definition, the
licensors have the whip’s hand when it comes to controlling output.  They’re the
ones who make the profit-maximizing decision as to whether they are going to
license exclusively or non-exclusively.  And competition for the contract, as Judge
Easterbrook put it in the Paddock case, becomes part of the arena of competition of
the industry which the antitrust laws not only permit but promote and protect,
because that’s the way that these markets work . . . . [A]fter the National Football
League went exclusive, the Arena Football League and the NCAA followed
suit . . . . they said, [‘]We will take bids for exclusive licenses[‘], and we bid on
them.”).
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ion was misguided and properly disregarded in Pecover.173  The
Pecover court foreshadowed the eventual Supreme Court holding in
American Needle, noting its skepticism regarding the applicability of
the “single-entity” theory to the licensing of NFL team logos to hats,
and the Seventh Circuit’s careful avoidance of discussing the liabil-
ity of the licensees.174  The court singled out as “the most notable
distinction” between the two cases the fact that American Needle in-
volved only the NFL while Pecover’s allegations concern three sepa-
rate licensors.175
The court’s cognizance of the case’s procedural posture sug-
gests that there may be merit to EA’s attempt to draw parallels be-
tween Pecover and the essential facilities cases.176The court made
clear that whether the plaintiffs will be able to prove that the names
and logos of actual teams are essential to market football video
games is an open question, and it differentiated Pecover from Fleer
based upon EA’s multiple licensing agreements.177  In doing so, the
court glossed over a point that is discussed with some depth in both
cases: “[c]ompetition-for-the-contract is a form of competition that
antitrust laws protect rather than proscribe, and it is common.”178
173. See Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 172, at 17 R
(contrasting EA’s argument that Seventh Circuit American Needle decision applies to
Pecover with court’s initial feeling that it does not, as American Needle did not involve
licenses from all various football organizations).  For a further discussion of the
Seventh Circuit’s handling of the American Needle case, see supra notes 132-133 and R
accompanying text.
174. See Pecover v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 976, 982 (“Although the
single-entity theory is somewhat less persuasive (to the undersigned, at least) when
it comes to licensing NFL team logos on headwear . . . .”); see also Transcript of
Hearing on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 172, at 27 (“The Seventh Circuit it- R
self . . . never discusses the liability of the licensee.  It is very careful to talk about
only the liability of the NFL defendants.  And the relevancy of that . . . is that a
holder of intellectual property does not need an exclusivity provision in order to
exclude people from its intellectual property.  So even if . . . there is a completely
unfettered right on behalf of an intellectual property holder to exclude from its
intellectual property, Electronic Arts still loses because it is not the holder of the
intellectual property.”).
175. See Pecover, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 982 (distinguishing facts of American Needle
from those of case at hand).
176. See id. at 983 (“Importantly, the Third Circuit decided Fleer on a motion
for summary judgment rather than on a motion to dismiss.  The court noted that
the determination whether the defendant’s conduct excluded all meaningful com-
petition was a mixed question of law and fact.”).
177. For a summary of the court’s handling of EA’s attempt to analogize
Pecover to Paddock, see supra notes 134-137 and accompanying text. R
178. See Paddock Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 45 (7th
Cir. 1996) (extolling virtues of competition as enshrined by antitrust law); Fleer
Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 139, 154 (3d Cir. 1981) (discussing
ability of plaintiff to compete for contracts at different level of market in order to
reenter MLB card market).
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While the exclusive license leaves little incentive for a competing
game developer to invest significant resources in both trying to de-
velop a game capable of competing with Madden and convincing
the NFL to sign a new licensing agreement, the barriers to entry for
this market are arguably due to the structures of the video game
and athletic industries.179  The license has not been granted in
perpetuity, and the NFL could decide to market its intellectual
property through another company in the future.180  Further, in
addition to violating the NFL’s right to dictate the terms of its li-
cense, sharing the “essential facility” here is neither practical nor
feasible.181
Despite any validity that EA’s or the plaintiffs’ essential facili-
ties-based arguments may have, the court also overlooks jurispru-
dence suggesting that such claims must arise from the distortion of
“a market in which plaintiff and defendant compete, such that a
monopolist extends its monopoly to the downstream market by re-
fusing access to the facility it controls.”182  The Supreme Court has
found a competitive relationship between two parties to be funda-
mental if one party seeks to invoke the Sherman Act in order to
force access to the property of another.183  Though this point does
179. See Fleer, 658 F.2d at 150-51 (“After careful examination, Topps’ exclusive
licensing agreements cannot be said to restrain trade unreasonably.  A rival manu-
facturer could compete head to head with Topps by seeking licenses with minor
league players.  The lag time required to enter the market with a competitive series
of trading cards is due in significant measure to the structure of organized base-
ball.”).  For a further discussion of the current state of the sports video game mar-
ket and possible disincentives to compete, see infra notes 198-202 and R
accompanying text.
180. See Paddock, 103 F.3d at 45 (“[T]he existence of three competing facili-
ties not only means that none is an ‘essential facility’ but also means that each of
the three is entitled to sign an exclusive contract with a favored user.  Other firms
that want to enter the market can do so by competing at intervals for these con-
tracts.”) (citing Flip Side Prods., Inc. v. JAM Prods., Ltd., 843 F.2d 1024, 1032-34
(7th Cir. 1988)).
181. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (holding
that sharing of facilities may not be imposed when doing so would impair owner’s
ability to render adequate service to customers); MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel.
& Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1133 (7th Cir. 1983) (examining whether access to
essential facility could feasibly been provided from company holding monopoly to
competitor).
182. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(citing TV Commc’ns Network, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 964 F.2d
1022, 1025 (10th Cir. 1992)); Consul, Ltd. v. Transco Energy Co., 805 F.2d 490,
494 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Proof of a relevant market is the threshold for a Sherman Act
§ 2 claim.  The plaintiff must establish the geographic and product market that
was monopolized.”).
183. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“[The Sherman
Act] rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the high-
35
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not completely undermine the plaintiffs’ argument, it does serve as
a reminder that the plaintiffs are seeking relief as a class of consum-
ers and that, at least for their section 2 claims, the indirect pur-
chaser doctrine dictates that any such relief be injunctive in
nature.184
Finally, the court’s discussion of California’s Cartwright Act ap-
propriately distinguishes the situation in Pecover from that of Levi
Case, as the latter involved a legally sanctioned monopoly rather
than an alleged aggregation of exclusive licenses.185  Although the
court’s analysis is driven in part by its obligation to address the ar-
guments raised by EA in its motion to dismiss, the focus of its Cart-
wright section is somewhat inconsistent with that of the rest of the
opinion.186  The court stresses that the Sherman Act and the Cart-
wright Act are interpreted in concert with one another, and that
the text of the California statute makes “combination[s] of capital,
skill, or acts by two or more persons” illegal.187  This language, how-
ever, more closely mirrors section 1 of the Sherman Act than sec-
tion 2, under which the plaintiffs’ brought their federal law
claim.188  The court references the Cartwright Act’s treatment of
exclusive dealing arrangements, in which “a seller agrees to sell all
or a substantial portion of its products or services to a particular
est quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an
environment conductive to the preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions.  But even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivo-
cally laid down by the Act is competition.”).
184. For a further discussion of the indirect purchaser doctrine, see supra
notes 93-95 and accompanying text. R
185. For a further discussion of Levi Case and the court’s reasoning in distin-
guishing it from Pecover, see supra notes 146-150 and accompanying text. See also R
Ramon A. Klitzke, Patents and Monopolization: The Role of Patents Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 557, 568 (1985) (“The grant of an exclusive license,
standing alone, is not a violation of the antitrust laws because such licenses are
clearly within the contemplation of the patent statutes.”).
186. See generally Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 172, R
at 38 (“There is no possibility of a Cartwright Act claim because there is no con-
certed action for the same reason that there is no Section 1 claim in the antitrust
case . . . .  They can’t say that there is concerted action for the Cartwright Act based
upon just the existence of the exclusive licenses because that runs squarely into
your decision in the Levi case 15 years ago.”).  However, given the clear legal and
factual differences between a case involving a patent holder and a sublicensee
compared to Pecover, EA may have raised the Levi analogy partly because the deci-
sion had been authored by the judge hearing Pecover (Hon. Vaughn R. Walker).
See Levi Case Co., Inc. v. ATS Products, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 428, 431 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(listing author as Judge Walker).
187. See Pecover v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 976, 983-84 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (quoting Cartwright Act and stating principle of interpretation for it).
188. For a comparison of the texts of section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman
Act, see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. R
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buyer, or when a buyer similarly agrees to purchase all or a portion
of its requirements of a product or service from a particular
seller.”189  While a rule of reason analysis would be used to evaluate
the legality of such an arrangement, it is less clear whether such an
inquiry is appropriate in Pecover.190
For example, Fisherman’s Wharf Bay Cruise Court v. Superior
Court, cited by the court to support the application of the rule of
reason test to exclusive dealing violations under the Cartwright Act,
analogizes section 1 to the California law when evaluating a claim
that one company sought to expand its monopoly power by using
below-cost pricing to induce tour operators to purchase tickets ex-
clusively from it.191 Pecover is different from such a situation be-
cause each of EA’s contracts can be viewed as a unilateral action.192
One scholar has argued that the language of the Cartwright Act,
compared to the combined wording of sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act, creates a loophole for illegal activity accomplished by sin-
gle firms:
The single-firm problem . . . is unique to conduct involv-
ing monopoly power.  This is because most illegal activities
which are comparable in section one violations require
concerted activity to create illegality whereas a deliberate
monopoly can be maintained by individual efforts.  Fur-
thermore, those section one activities which are capable of
arising from single-firm activity are condemned by addi-
tional [California] statutory provisions.  This is generally
not the case with violations comparable to section two.  As
a result, the Cartwright Act does not provide for enforce-
189. See LEGAL INFO. INST., Exclusive Dealing Arrangement, CORNELL UNIV. L.
SCH., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/exclusive_dealing_arrangement (last vis-
ited Mar. 19, 2012) (giving overview of illegality of certain types of exclusive deal-
ing under Sherman Act).
190. See Gordon M. Cowan, California’s Single-Firm Monopoly Loophole, 18 CAL.
W. L. REV. 240, 250 (1982) (“Under the Cartwright Act, such arrangements are
proscribed when it is probable that a substantial share of the particular line of
commerce would be foreclosed from competition.  Under section one, only ‘un-
reasonable’ exclusive contracts are illegal.”) (citations omitted).  “This area of bus-
iness practice is governed by section one of the Sherman Act.” See also id. at 250
n.67 (describing coverage of exclusive dealing by Sherman Act).
191. See Fisherman’s Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Super. Ct., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628,
648-49 (Ct. App. 2004) (framing plaintiff’s cause of action and proper legal analy-
sis to be used).
192. See Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 172, at 43-44 R
(“[Y]ou can’t count the license itself as the concerted action. . . . [T]here is no
allegation that [EA] conspired with Take-Two.  There is no allegation that the NFL
conspire[d] with the AFL of the NCAA.  The only action is that, on three separate
occasions, Electronic Arts showed up and bid for what was offered, and it won.”).
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ment against deliberate monopolies which are created
and maintained by a single firm.193
This is not to say that that the court’s introduction of some section
1 concepts into its Cartwright Act analysis, after primarily examin-
ing the plaintiffs’ section 2 claims, is fatal to the opinion; rather,
this shift may simply reflect the reality of plaintiffs litigating anti-
trust claims under three statutes with overlapping scopes.194
VI. IMPACT: “IF A GAME LIKE MADDEN HAS A PROBLEM
DISTINGUISHING ITSELF AGAINST NO COMPETITION, HOW
IS IT ANY EASIER FOR A CONTENDER SPORTS
PRODUCT TO BREAK OUT?”
On December 21, 2010, Judge Walker certified the plaintiffs’
class.195  In Pecover, Judge Walker evaluated the plaintiffs’ claims
under the relatively permissive plausibility standard.196 His discus-
sion of each side’s arguments, however, did seem to indicate a de-
gree of openness to a wide range of potential theories of liability.197
Any future victories for the plaintiffs may not have a large effect on
similar licenses that exist between other professional sports leagues
and game publishers, such as the one between Take Two Interac-
193. See Cowan, supra note 190, at 252 (arguing that much activity illegal R
under antitrust law accomplished by single firms is non-actionable under Cart-
wright Act) (citations omitted).
194. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (“But
the crime under [section 1] is legally distinct from that under [section 2] though
the two sections overlap in the sense that a monopoly under [section 2] is a species
of restraint of trade under [section 1].”) (citations omitted); see also Cowan, supra
note 190, at 247 (“It is arguable that a monopoly is a form of trade restraint.  It R
follows that monopolies in general are not only covered under section two but
section one as well.”) (citations omitted).  For a comparison of the origins and
wording of section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act with the Cartwright Act, see supra
notes 50-57 and notes 109-116. R
195. See Order Granting Class Certification at 1, Pecover v. Elec. Arts, Inc.,
633 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 08-2820); see Molina, supra note 5 (an- R
nouncing certification of class); see Amended Order Concerning Duties and In-
structions for Court-Appointed Technical Advisor and Modifying Case Schedule,
Pecover v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 08-2820),
2012 WL 1029531, at *4 (modifying case schedule to allow Technical Advisor to
review documents filed by parties, file report on motions, and leave adequate time
between motion hearing and trial date)
196. See Pecover v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 976, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(summarizing motion to dismiss standard of review).  For a further discussion of
this standard of review, see supra notes 117-122 and accompanying text. R
197. For a summary of Judge Walker’s opinion in Pecover, see supra notes 123- R
154 and accompanying text.  For a critical analysis of that opinion, see supra notes R
155-194 and accompanying text. R
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tive, Inc. (Take Two) and Major League Baseball (MLB).198  With
that exclusive license expiring this year, MLB has stated that it will
open up the contract to multiple developers.199  In fact, Take Two
has lost tens of millions of dollars on the exclusive MLB license due
to poor reviews and sales.200  Presently, the markets for sports-based
video games generally do not feature directly competing titles, de-
spite the fact that only the NFL, MLB, and the International Feder-
ation of Association Football (FIFA) have entered into (nearly)
exclusive licenses with publishers.201
198. See Tor Thorsen, Take-Two Inks Agreement With MLB Players Association,
GAMESPOT (Jan. 24, 2005, 10:20 AM), http://www.gamespot.com/news/take-two-
inks-agreement-with-mlb-players-association-6116946 (announcing preliminary de-
tails of exclusive licensing agreement similar to one struck by EA and NFL); see also
Jon Robinson, EA Sports Jumping Back Into Baseball?, ESPN (Mar. 22, 2011, 3:21
PM), http://espn.go.com/espn/thelife/videogames/blog/_/name/thegamer/
id/6247274 (“When gamers talk with disgust about exclusive licenses, the first title
always brought up is ‘NFL 2K5.’  But in my opinion, it’s the ridiculous exclusive
Major League Baseball signed with 2K Sports that still leaves me outraged, espe-
cially considering that the deal killed off one of the most beloved sports gaming
franchises of all time, EA Sports’ ‘MVP Baseball.’”).  In a somewhat ironic reversal
of the situation at issue in Pecover, Take-Two’s exclusive license meant that EA had
to stop publishing its game once the new licensing deal came into effect. See Thor-
sen, supra (commenting on effect of agreement).  Interestingly, as this deal was
struck only a short time after the EA/NFL agreement, an EA spokesperson gener-
ally praises these types of deals: “We will launch [our game] this spring, and we’re
exploring our long term options.  This proves that there’s plenty of competition in
sports games.” See id. (discussing future of EA’s baseball games).
199. See MLB 2K May Just Be Playing Out The String, PASTAPADRE (Dec. 3, 2010,
2:30 PM), http://www.pastapadre.com/2010/12/03/mlb-2k-may-just-be-playing-
out-the-string (“The MLB has already stated they will not renew a third party deal
and instead have opted to open up the contract to multiple parties after 2012.”).
200. See id. (“Take Two/2K Sports has taken a bath with the third party MLB
license they signed in 2005.  Just in 2010 alone they estimated a loss of $30-40
million due to the license.”); see also MLB 2K9 Blamed for Take Two Losses, PAS-
TAPADRE (Dec. 3, 2009, 2:14 PM), http://www.pastapadre.com/2009/12/03/mlb-
2k9-blamed-for-take-two-losses (“MLB 2K9 was one of only two . . . major yearly
sports titles that dropped in sales compared to the previous year.  It was poorly
received by both reviewers and gamers and that clearly affected sales after years of
subpar offerings.”).
201. See Owen Good, You Can Have Any Sports Video Game You Want, But There’s
Only One, KOTAKU (May 28, 2011, 8:00 PM), http://kotaku.com/5806547/you-can-
have-any-sports-video-game-you-want-but-theres-only-one (“Today, in video gaming,
there is only one fully licensed simulation available for all consoles in each team
sport.  Madden’s notorious exclusive license with the NFL gets the most attention,
but FIFA’s deal with its titular authority, and exclusive pacts with other interna-
tional football leagues, have also helped to relegate Pro Evolution Soccer to its
also-ran status.”).  “Still, there is only one college football game.  There’s only one
NASCAR game.  There’s only one golf simulation, only one boxing simulation,
only one pro wrestling “simulation,” and when 2012 rolls around, we’ll probably
have just one mixed martial arts sim[ulation]. . . .  If there’s any major sport with
directly competing video games, it’s tennis . . . .” See id. (describing state of video
game market for sports simulations playable on home consoles).
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The recent trend of game publishers seeking and acquiring the
equivalent of exclusive deals suggests that “the free market has
swung the axe on its own”.202  The emergence of these league-spe-
cific consolidated markets (mostly divided between EA and Take
Two, one of the developers of the NFL 2K series) may lend
credence to the Pecover plaintiffs’ arguments that (1) the market for
“interactive video football software” is a recognizable one for Sher-
man Act purposes and (2) there is almost no demand for these
games if they lack the license required to portray actual teams and
players.203  The plaintiffs may also point, more generally, to these
other sports titles as evidence that consumers of football games de-
serve to benefit from competition between developers.204  At the
same time, EA could cite these developments to support an argu-
ment it made in its motion to dismiss: obtaining multiple exclusive
licenses “cannot violate antitrust laws as a matter of law because
such a rule would deny licensors the benefit of bidding competi-
tion.”205  Under this theory, Pecover is ultimately about the right of
202. See id. (“That’s the idea . . . [g]et an exclusive deal without paying for
it.”).  The author theorizes that these organically created monopolies have come
about for a variety of reasons:
Development costs have plenty to do with it, especially in a poorer econ-
omy.  I’d argue, however, that after a decade of refining the games, with
visual capabilities ever approaching photorealism, the creative difficulty
of differentiating these titles is an especially big reason, too.  These are
games based on sports with rule sets that are, in many cases, more than
100 years old.  The guts of how the game is played isn’t changing much at
all.  Established annual sports titles struggle every year against the percep-
tion it’s the same as the previous edition.  If a game like Madden has a
problem distinguishing itself against no competition, how is it any easier
for a contender sports product to break out?
See id.
203. For a summary of the plaintiff’s arguments regarding the existence of a
distinct product market, see supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.  For a R
further discussion of the plaintiffs’ Sherman Act section 2 claims and the court’s
handling of those claims, see supra notes 159-171 and accompanying text. R
204. For a brief summary of the facts that underlie plaintiffs’ argument that
EA’s accumulation of licenses deprived consumers of the benefits of market com-
petition, see supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text. R
205. See Pecover v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 976, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(explaining EA’s attacks on plaintiffs’ arguments in its motion to dismiss).  As EA’s
attorney argued during oral argument for the motion to dismiss:
[I]f there are monopoly rents, it’s only because the output decision that
was inherently in the hands of the licensor was exercised in a particular
way by the licensor.  The output decision is theirs.To the extent the case
is based upon the notion that the key asset for producing output is the
licenses, then the output decision is the licensor’s.  This is the fundamen-
tal nature of intellectual property.  And the licensor can make a decision
to divide that and have nonexclusive licenses, or it can make a decision to
essentially reduce intra-brand competition for the benefit of other
interests.
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the leagues to control the use of their intellectual property by, for
example, incentivizing game developers to continue to innovate
and drive sales in order to retain the license granted to them.206
In the end, the plaintiffs’ arguments, while often convincing,
may not be enough to overcome the judicial inertia of recent de-
cades.207  Courts have been extremely hesitant to impose antitrust
liability for a unilateral refusal to license a copyright, so it is possible
that respect for licensors’ decisions may extend to the licensees who
receive the intellectual property in question.208  Recently, however,
the Ninth Circuit (where Pecover could hypothetically be argued on
appeal) has shown that it is not afraid of pursuing its own interpre-
tation of antitrust law.209  Some commentators have called section 2
of the Sherman Act an “antitrust flashpoint,” noting a “profound
difference of views . . . concerning the core principles that ought to
guide Section 2[ ]” cases.210  This sentiment, combined with the
costly, fact-intensive nature of antitrust litigation and Pecover’s incor-
See Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 172, at 41-42. R
206. See Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE 5 (Apr. 6, 1995), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf
(“This integration can lead to more efficient exploitation of the intellectual prop-
erty, benefiting consumers through the reduction of costs and the introduction of
new products.  Such arrangements increase the value of intellectual property to
consumers and to the developers of the technology.  By potentially increasing the
expected returns from intellectual property, licensing also can increase the incen-
tive for its creation and thus promote greater investment in research and
development.”).
207. See Briggs & Matheson, supra note 58, at 137 (“In recent decades, the R
Supreme Court has been in an affectionate embrace with unilateral conduct by a
dominant firm.  The Court has lauded the stimulating effect of efforts to achieve
monopoly and generally has been reluctant to declare unlawful conduct except
where particular practices are overwhelmingly likely not to represent competition
on the merits.”).  For a further discussion of the Court’s developing stance on
antitrust law, see supra notes 74-91 and accompanying text. R
208. See Halverson & Telpner, supra note 50, at 15 (“Virtually all cases examin- R
ing this question have refused to attach section 2 liability to a refusal to license
intellectual property, provided that there is no attempt to extend the scope of the
intellectual property protection beyond the limits of the statutory grant.”).
209. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillian, 506 U.S. 447, 456-57 (1993)
(articulating elements of attempted monopoly followed by all circuits except Ninth
Circuit and reversing its decision in light of array of contrary authority).
210. See Mark S. Popofsky, The Section 2 Debate: Should Lenity Play a Role?, 7
RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 1, 7-8 (2010) (describing recent controversy over scope and ap-
plication of section 2).  “Moreover, although the substantive legal tests that govern
certain categories of conduct are settled, there is perhaps more about Section 2
that is undecided than decided.” See id.
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poration of state law antitrust claims, suggests that the eventual res-
olution of Pecover may depend on a lengthy battle of experts.211
Robert T. Sharkey*
211. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come, 61 TUL. L. REV. 777, 809 (1987) (“Antitrust suits are frequently lengthy,
complicated and costly both in terms of monetary costs, including legal fees re-
lated to discovery expenses, and nonmonetary costs, including dislocation of em-
ployees, decline in firm morale and negative publicity.”); see Feldman, supra note
42, at 911 (“[T]he discovery process can still be burdensome and expensive even
in nonfrivolous cases . . . .”); see also Chad Lakkis, EA Exclusive License Undone? Sports
Antitrust Law Professor Explains American Needle Impact, RIP TEN (May 28, 2010, 6:36
PM), http://www.ripten.com/2010/05/28/sports-antitrust-law-professor-explains-
american-needle-verdict-impact-on-eas-exclusive-nfl-licensing-agreement/ (stating
that in hypothetical antitrust suit between NFL and video game manufacturers,
expert economic testimony rather than consumer impressions will determine
court’s decision).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., Univer-
sity of Virginia, 2010.
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